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2This SFI pamphlet provides  a Policy 
Briefing on the critical and ubiquitous 
role being performed by benchmarking 
in public services both in the UK and 
internationally. It complements and 
partly draws on a special issue of Public 
Money and Management  edited by me 
and Alan Fenna which also addresses 
these issues, and which includes some 
overlapping material treated in greater 
depth, and with comprehensive references 
(see Public services benchmarking and 
external performance assessment: An 
international perspective. Guest editors: 
Clive Grace and Alan Fenna (Vol. 33, No. 
4, 2013) at http://www.tandfonline.com/r/
pmm-benchmarking).  The pieces by Bevan 
and Wilson, Coughlin, Downe et al, Fenna, 
Hammerschmid et al, Kuhlmann and Jäkel, 
Lu, McAteer and Martin,  Schober, and 
Stephens will all be found there in one  
form or another.  I am very grateful to 
the Editors of PMM for their support in 
preparing this publication, and especially 
their Managing Editor Micky Lavender.
 
I also thank my colleagues at the Solace 
Foundation in particular for sharing their 
public platform with the Guardian in order 
to give these issues the widest possible 
airing, and David Gooda at Northern 
Design Collective for helping us present it 
so professionally.
Finally, I would emphasis our continuing 
appreciation to both the ESRC and the 
Forum of Federations for their support, 
which is explained in more detail in  
the Foreword.
Clive Grace
November 2013
Editor’s note
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A Confluence of Interest  
This SFI pamphlet is grounded in two major streams 
of work initially conducted by separate teams of 
researchers and policy analysts in the UK and in Canada. 
In the UK, a team based at Cardiff and Edinburgh (and 
later St Andrews) Universities in various combinations 
explored performance issues across UK local 
government through a series of studies funded by a 
range of government and research bodies. A particular 
focus for them became the variety and comparison of 
local/central regimes for assessing the performance of 
local government and of local services in the emerging 
‘natural laboratory’ of post-devolution UK.  Meanwhile 
in Canada, the Forum of Federations developed the 
performance benchmarking of services between federal 
and state/provincial levels as a major theme of its work 
across the world, reflecting the growth of that activity 
in many federal jurisdictions. Its work covers Australia, 
Canada, the European Union, Germany, Switzerland and 
the United States.
The two came together in 2011 in a joint project funded 
partly by the Forum and by the ESRC (ESRC Knowledge 
Exchange Programme award number ES/J010707/1) 
with the aim to improve local public services through a 
series of linked conferences, seminars and workshops 
to enable two-way dialogue and collaboration to help 
improve the assessment of public services so they are 
more affordable, better meet community needs, and 
respond to underlying change. We also aimed to inform 
the design of subsequent research through identifying 
gaps in the knowledge base and possible avenues 
for future innovation and learning. The UK team was 
Dr James Downe (Principal Investigator), Dr Clive 
Grace, Professor Steve Martin, and Professor Sandra 
Nutley, and the Canadian team was Felix Knüpling and 
Professor Alan Fenna.  Part of the prospectus for the 
project was to prepare a Policy Briefing to provide a 
review of international performance assessment written 
specifically for a policy and practitioner audience, and 
distributed widely via the web, professional associations 
and other media. It would aim to draw on existing 
research knowledge and bring together lessons from 
the conferences and seminars to highlight best practice 
from across the world.  This pamphlet gives effect to 
that intention, together with a special issue of Public 
Money and Management edited by Grace and Fenna 
(http://www.tandfonline.com/r/pmm-benchmarking) 
which also addresses these issues, and which includes 
some overlapping material treated in greater depth. 
Foreword
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The collection of pieces here starts with a flavour 
of the international range and variety. Schober 
documents the minuet which has taken place over 
many years between the US federal government 
and the states in relation to education 
performance, in a jurisdiction which few of us 
might immediately associate with benchmarking—
at least in the public sector. Thomson then 
documents developments in the related field of 
child welfare, but in Canada and in relation to an 
even more complex set of issues and a much more 
varied set of delivery bodies. Fenna demonstrates 
the global character of benchmarking through his 
account of the Australian Report on Government 
Services. Lu then shows that these methodologies 
are also finding traction in China – for China is not, 
as she puts it, immune to the global movement 
of performance evaluation. She explores the 
who, what and how of the subject in Guangdong 
province, after what is almost a decade of activity 
there in this field. This plants the thought that 
the scope for the application of performance 
assessment of public services in China as a whole 
is significant.
Bevan and Wilson provide the bridge to a group 
of pieces which assess developments in the UK 
and re-assess the UK’s situation. They review both 
health and education performance in England and 
Wales to take account of that ‘natural laboratory’ 
of public services differences. They conclude that 
exposing professionals to reputational risk has a 
significant impact on performance. This is not a 
ringing endorsement of ‘terror and targets’, but 
it might well encourage central policy-makers to 
be tougher about publication and transparency 
in relation to benchmarks and performance 
measures. Meanwhile Downe et al. review how 
performance regimes have developed across the 
UK. They find interesting variations and change 
in the positions being taken in England, Scotland 
and Wales, and those changes are not at all in one 
direction—there is no obvious ‘maturity model’ at 
work here. Rather, the political and administrative 
context is perhaps what most explains the 
direction of travel, including directions of travel 
between England and Wales, for example, which 
look to be crossing each other in opposite paths 
to those they have previously taken. To underpin 
these broader analyses, Coughlin, McAteer 
and Martin, and Stephens describe recent 
developments in all UK three jurisdictions around 
what might be thought of as the nuts and bolts 
of benchmarking and performance management. 
The message here is the medium, as much as the 
content—all three local government associations 
are taking a stronger and more positive approach 
to the importance of collecting, validating and 
publishing benchmark and performance data. 
This is part of taking a wider and more mature 
role in sector-led improvement—because sector-
led improvement requires local authorities (both 
individually and collectively) to take responsibility 
for improvement as well as merely to have it.
The significance of political and administrative 
context is apparent also in the piece by Kuhlmann 
and Jäkel, the first of two with a European 
comparative perspective. They stand
back and review inter-municipal benchmarking 
regimes across four very different European 
jurisdictions, and find it possible to make the 
connections between regime and context. The
way performance is compared and benchmarked 
among local governments varies widely in the 
OECD world, but the governance structures of 
inter-municipal benchmarking regimes currently 
to be found in European countries are largely 
shaped and influenced by the ‘starting conditions’ 
of reforms. We are all prisoners of context now, 
it seems, because Hammerschmid et al. also 
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find it to be of importance in explaining the 
actual use of performance information by a large 
cadre of managers of high-level public sector 
executives from six European countries. The use 
of such information varied considerably, but that 
variation was seen to be strongly influenced by 
the context of the implementation of performance 
management instruments in an organization.
Three interesting ‘niche’ areas of benchmarking 
are then explored by Cutler (the history of 
benchmarking school buildings in the UK), James 
(benchmarking and elections) and Prychodko 
and Dziong (customer focus in Canadian 
municipalities), before Quirk winds it all up 
through a practitioner’s reflections on where 
benchmarking and performance assessment sits 
within the wider lexicon of improvement action.
Next Steps
Readers of this pamphlet are encouraged to join 
the group set up on the LGA’s Knowledge Hub 
to build a network of policy-makers, academics 
and practitioners with an interest in performance 
assessment and benchmarking. The group 
will facilitate further knowledge exchange and 
research opportunities. It contains all materials 
from the UK and international events (www.
knowledgehub.local.gov.uk/register then see 
‘Benchmarking and external performance 
assessment’. See also www.forumfed.org). 
Clive Grace is Honorary Research Fellow at 
Cardiff Business School, James Downe is 
Reader of Public Policy and Management at 
the Centre for Local & Regional Government 
Research, Cardiff Business School, Alan 
Fenna is Professor of Government at Curtin 
University, Perth, Australia, Felix Knüpling 
is Head of Programs, Forum of Federations, 
Steve Martin is Professor of Public Policy and 
Management at Cardiff Business School, and 
Sandra Nutley is Professor of Public Policy and 
Management at the University of St. Andrews
7Introduction
Benchmarking of public services matters 
because it is critical for governments and 
communities who need to know whether 
services are effective and efficient, who 
is accountable for service delivery, and 
whether the outcomes of service delivery 
are in the interests of the citizenry. It is an 
important framework for policy decision-
making as well improving delivery. 
Narrowly defined, benchmarking 
involves the comparative measurement 
of performance but we can understand 
it more broadly to mean the use of 
comparative performance measurement 
as a tool for identifying and adopting more 
efficient or effective practices. For us, it is 
more than an assessment device, it is also 
a learning and adjustment tool.  Seen in 
this light, benchmarking is so ubiquitous 
within public services management 
and measurement that it is not so 
much a technique as a way of thinking 
— a disposition toward comparative 
assessment, learning, and action. Thus 
in the context of this pamphlet it refers 
to the comparison of some aspect of a 
public service against a standard, against 
the services of others, or against one’s 
own services over time, coupled with an 
intention to learn and improve. Yet that 
simplicity masks a world of interesting and 
often difficult questions. 
Benchmarking exercises have been widely 
adopted in devolved and federal systems. 
All devolved countries face the issue of 
balancing the interests of the national or 
Benchmarking and the 
Improvement End of the 
Telescope
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federal government in key areas of public 
policy with the desire of subnational units 
or local government to have autonomy 
or at least flexibility in terms of how they 
manage programs. In many devolved 
countries there has been a trend towards a 
flexible kind of relationship between orders 
of government in areas of joint interest. 
Conditions imposed by the central/federal 
level are becoming less restrictive. As 
such controls are loosened many devolved 
countries are showing a strong interest in 
benchmarking in order to determine ‘good’ 
or ‘best practices’. This development 
can be observed in developed as well as 
developing countries alike.
8It may be the chameleon character 
of benchmarking that underpins its 
popularity as an approach to performance 
management and measurement. In 
any event, that popularity is increasing 
internationally, and we should understand 
better why that is so and what are its 
consequences, as well as how it might be 
done better.
Origins
Like other aspects of ‘new public 
management’, benchmarking is a practice 
that has spread from the private to the 
public sector with the promise that it will 
drive improvements in service delivery.    
Both ‘external’ (voluntary with other 
companies) and ‘internal’ (imposed by top 
management on company units) versions of 
benchmarking can be found in the private 
sector — often referred to as, respectively, 
‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ benchmarking. 
However, it is the top-down version that 
tends to predominate in public services. 
The lack of intrinsic financial incentive and 
externally validated profit measures in the 
public sector is in some ways precisely the 
reason for introducing benchmarking there 
— just as it has been for internally imposed 
benchmarking in major private companies. 
Performance monitoring and the imposition 
of benchmarking requirements is a public 
sector surrogate for market forces. This 
may be initiated by an individual agency 
to improve its own performance but given 
the lower level of intrinsic incentive and the 
greater difficulties, such action is likely to 
be the exception to the rule. In reality, the 
lower level of incentive means that public 
sector agencies are more likely to need 
such requirements to be imposed on them.  
Hence, then, the attraction of a quite 
different form of sanction: the political 
device of naming and shaming. Here the 
exercise has the public as audience — an 
audience it is assumed can be reached 
effectively and will respond in a way 
that has the desired sanctioning effect. 
Reaching such an audience often means 
simplifying performance information 
to construct ‘league tables’ ranking 
jurisdictions or agencies according to their 
performance. Well-known in the context 
of schools performance, this is a much 
debated device such as teaching to the test 
where measured performance is enhanced 
by neglecting the broader suite of often 
less tangible or immediate concerns, 
and where the overall purpose may be 
eclipsed in these efforts to achieve the 
measured targets. Since indicators are at 
best incomplete representations of policy 
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objectives and sometimes vague proxies, 
and there is always going to be a tendency 
to ‘hit the target and miss the point’. 
Gaming takes the problem one step further, 
with performance monitoring regimes 
giving agents an incentive to structure 
their activities in such a way as to produce 
the desired indication of results without 
necessarily generating any improvement 
in real results. We could expect that the 
higher the stakes involved, the higher the 
propensity for perverse behaviour of both 
those forms. 
It is however possible to design systems to 
partly address such problems. Proponents 
argue that good design and improvement 
over time will minimise pathologies and 
even if there are such dysfunctional 
responses, the overall gain may outweigh 
the costs.  Further, such problems may 
be more likely to arise in the assessment 
of complex outcomes, but in any event 
some of the simpler benchmarking 
requirements which create less opportunity 
for gaming have real potential value. 
There is much utility in measuring public 
sector outputs and in measuring output 
efficiency (‘process benchmarking’) and 
there are a number of practical services 
which government provides where difficult 
measures of ‘impact’ are not the issue - 
although even here there may be significant 
challenges given the complexity of many 
public sector outputs.
For benchmarking advocates the 
creation of such regimes prompts and 
promotes progressive improvement in 
the data - ‘a poor start is better than no 
start’. One lesson of the UK experience 
with a performance monitoring reliance 
on quantitative indicators, though, 
seems to have been that significant 
qualitative dimensions slip through the 
net with potential for quite misleading 
conclusions to be drawn. For public 
sector benchmarking, much hinges on 
the development of reliable indicators in 
regard to both processes and outcomes. 
In addition, it requires that data sets be 
fully consistent across the benchmarked 
entities and reasonably consistent over 
time. And, given the complex relationship 
between government action and particular 
economic or social desiderata and the 
degree to which circumstances vary, 
assessment of those data must be well 
contextualised to ensure adequate analysis 
and interpretation.
9Benchmarking in the UK
The UK warrants a particular focus 
when it comes to benchmarking.  In 
the summer of 2010 the newly elected 
coalition government announced the 
abolition of the principal benchmarking 
and performance management regime 
for local government in England, the 
Comprehensive Area Assessment, and its 
intention to abolish the principal authors 
and stewards of that regime, the Audit 
Commission as well. The government also 
announced new requirements for public 
services to publish more information so 
that an ‘army of armchair auditors’ would 
be sufficiently equipped to hold those 
services to account directly.
These policies were introduced in the 
context of the wider programme with its 
emphasis on ‘localism’ and on the ‘Big 
Society’, and a comprehensive assault on 
the many intermediary and ‘arms-length 
bodies’ which were seen as fogging the 
relationship between government and 
citizenry. They were also a reaction to 
a decade or more of what was seen as 
top down performance management, 
inhibiting the exercise of professional 
discretion at the front line and creating a 
bureaucratic morass.
The current ‘localist’ philosophy 
propounded by some in the UK coalition 
government has taken UK policy-
makers into unchartered waters. It 
shifts the balance of public and private 
accountability, and re-draws the lines 
between state intervention and individual 
responsibility. It assumes that local 
authorities will scrutinize their own 
performance and voters will make ‘rational’ 
choices when presented with performance 
data, as they do in an efficient market. 
Thus public service performance regimes 
return to private sector benchmarking 
methodologies. But there are important 
questions to be answered: will the 
information be sufficient (or perhaps too 
much), and how can it be harnessed to 
support and inform consumer behaviour 
to drive the desired outcomes of greater 
efficiency and effectiveness? At the same 
time, governments in Wales and Scotland 
have electoral mandates that affect the 
performance assessment of local public 
services in those jurisdictions.
There are indeed many varieties of 
benchmarking in the UK. First, there 
is a wide range of service-based cost 
and technical comparisons conducted 
as benchmarking ‘clubs’ of one kind 
or another. These include those of the 
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Improvement Service in Scotland in 
conjunction with Solace;  the Association 
of Public Service Excellence (APSE), a not-
for-profit voluntary body established with 
service comparisons of ‘blue collar’ local 
government services as a core aim; the 
Chartered Institute for Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA), a major professional 
accountancy body for, inter alia, local 
government finance staff; and the Wales 
Audit Office (WAO), the statutory public 
audit body for Wales. Also in this area  
are the ‘communities of practice’ 
established across a range of different 
services by the Improvement and 
Development Agency (IDeA), an agency of 
the Local Government Association (LGA), 
which has now been absorbed within the 
LGA, and the development of LGA’s own 
‘INFORM’ project.
Secondly, there have been a series 
of centrally determined performance 
indicator sets with results often published 
in the form of league tables. Then there 
have been performance regimes for 
local authorities, looking at the whole 
organisation and testing them against 
pre-set frameworks, including the 
Comprehensive Performance
Assessment (England), the Wales 
Programme for Improvement, and  
Best Value Audits (Scotland). These led 
in England to a yet wider programme 
of Comprehensive Area Assessments, 
which brought together data on a much 
wider group of local services. Alongside 
these performance regimes has been a 
programme of ‘voluntary’ assessments 
using external peer review methods  
against a framework underpinned by 
the European Framework for Quality 
Management (EFQM).
There have also been major excellence 
benchmarking schemes, which test  
projects and services against a pre-
designed benchmark to identify best and 
excellent practice, and most notably the 
central government run Beacon Council 
Scheme in England.
Performance assessments such as these 
are important partly because of ‘vertical 
fiscal imbalance’, where there is a lack of 
alignment between the level of government 
or the agency which is paying for a service 
and that which is delivering it.  Further, 
high-profile service failures have eroded 
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confidence in professionals to protect 
the interests of their pupils, patients and 
clients, replacing traditional trust-based 
bureaucratic and professional controls 
with more explicit contractual relations. 
At the same time, the marketization and 
associated fragmentation of responsibility 
for public service delivery has left 
governments reaching for ‘long distance 
mechanisms of control’ to exert oversight 
over increasingly complex networks of 
providers. External assessment played a 
pivotal role in the Blair/Brown governments’ 
strategy for public services reform. New 
Labour believed that top-down ‘terror and 
targets’ provided an important stimulus 
for improvement. In contrast, the devolved 
administrations of Scotland and Wales 
have eschewed ‘hard-edged’ performance 
regimes, developing their own more 
consensual approaches to assessment. 
The different methods of performance 
assessment adopted within the UK over  
the past 10 years provided a ‘natural 
laboratory’ for comparing the effects of 
‘cooperative’ and ‘competitive’ approaches. 
This is an issue that has gained interest 
internationally as governments move 
towards more self-regulation by local 
government and scrutiny by citizens  
acting as ‘armchair auditors’.
There is a quite strong and definite 
relationship between benchmarking 
instruments and theories of improvement 
but it is not always easy to pin down in 
particular instances. The range, even 
at one particular moment, can be 
considerable, and available scenarios as 
to how the relationship might develop 
can carry a strongly normative character. 
Thus, a relationship of ‘targets and terror’ 
carries both potential risks and rewards 
and a potential regulatory burden but 
one which may pay dividends. Central 
and local government and regulators 
alike may remain wedded to such 
models when they have already passed 
their optimum effectiveness, and when 
central government needs to let go 
and local government needs to move 
beyond mere compliance. In contrast, 
an era of ‘cooperation and contract’ 
in central–local relations invites the 
use of both different instruments and 
different behaviours, especially if the 
focus is switched to achieving desired 
outcomes rather than merely delivering 
desirable outputs. If the other end of the 
spectrum is reached — one that may be 
characterised as a locally driven approach 
of ‘initiative and innovation’ — then the 
role of benchmarking is likely to look very 
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different, and perhaps much less intensive. 
As seen by one of the high priests of public 
service change and improvement in the 
UK, it is really a question of whether, for 
example, the entity to be improved needs 
to move from ‘awful to adequate’ or is 
rather at the stage of going from ‘good to 
great’ (Barber: 2007).
Benchmarking in one form or another has 
featured in all the ‘theories of
improvement’ as applied to UK local 
government. Moreover, each benchmarking
instrument carries — at least potentially — 
a ‘sub-theory’, which helps explain
(were it to be articulated) what behaviour  
it is hoping to stimulate or inhibit through
its application. Such theories are not, of 
course, always made explicit, and if they
are they may not be right about the 
behaviour predicted. Nor is it always the 
case that where a bundle of instruments 
are explicitly assembled, the resulting 
composite ‘theory’ will be internally 
coherent or fully comprehensive. Just  
as UK governments have been vigorous 
in their use of benchmarking for local 
government, so have they also been fairly 
explicit about what they hoped to achieve 
and how — but they may not have got  
it right. 
An International  Phenomenon
The simplicity of benchmarking and the 
global ‘reach’ of NPM within public services 
has given it an international character (see 
for example Mizell: 2009) which looks at 
developments in Norway, Italy, Austria, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands.  This international character 
has at least three dimensions.
The first of these is its relevance for 
countries with developed public services 
but with a federal rather than a unitary 
character, such as Australia, Canada, and 
the United States.
A number of questions arise for federal 
systems, most notably in the way that 
benchmarking arrangements may affect 
intergovernmental relations and the
functioning of the federal system, and the 
extent to which it enhances federalism 
and what form of benchmarking is most 
conducive to effective federal practice.  
Alongside these, federal jurisdictions 
experience more universal issues such as 
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the challenges entailed in moving from 
performance monitoring to active policy 
learning, and whether benchmarking 
actually leads to improved outcomes 
In federal systems, central governments 
and constituent units have to balance the 
centripetal and centrifugal impulses for 
country-wide policy outcomes
on the one hand, and policy outcomes that 
respect state autonomy or at least
promote flexibility, on the other. 
Benchmarking has become part of that, 
and thus an important aspect of federal 
governance.   But the issue of how to 
set up the governance of benchmarking 
regimes is also emerging as a key issue. 
One assessment is that models of a 
collegial nature, that are not based on 
hierarchy, targets and reputation effects 
(naming and shaming), encourage the 
greatest willingness of constituent units to 
participate. However, the jury stands out 
whether it is those arrangements that best 
lead to performance improvement. 
The second international dimension is the 
relevance of benchmarking to developing 
countries. This is well reflected in GIZ’s 
‘Assessing Public Sector Performance’ 
(2011: Bonn) which reviews what are 
essentially benchmarking methodologies 
in the Philippines, Nepal, Indonesia, 
Ethiopia, and Paraguay.  They demonstrate 
the variety of focus, indicators and 
methodologies which operate, and the 
critical role which administrative, political 
and developmental context plays in 
shaping their objectives and scope.  They 
also establish clearly that whilst there are no 
‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions, there are factors 
without which success is unlikely, although 
they cannot guarantee success.  They 
include issues of ownership, the importance 
of incentives, simplicity, transparency, and 
the need to relate performance measures 
to policy objectives for the public service 
sector which is at issue.
The third international dimension is the 
extent to which benchmarking permits 
comparison of public service performance 
between countries and also regions within 
countries.  The outstanding domain 
here is the educational attainment of 
young learners which is captured in the 
OECD’s PISA methodology (‘Programme 
for International Student Assessment’), 
providing longitudinal and horizontal 
comparison in various fields of educational 
attainment across 70 developed and 
developing countries (see http://www.oecd.
org/pisa).  Interestingly, PISA has informed 
not only comparative assessment between 
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countries and for individual countries 
over time in a developmental context.  
It also directly informed political and 
administrative action within the UK by the 
Welsh Government which drew on  
PISA data to confirm that despite 
equivalent injections of resource into both 
Welsh and English education following 
devolution, the attainment of Welsh 
learners had fallen well behind their English 
counterparts.  This appeared to be related 
to the differences in approach adopted 
in Welsh public services as compared to 
England – significantly in a post-devolution 
context it had been necessary to employ 
wider international comparators because 
an in-UK comparison was not as such in 
practice otherwise available.
Another important benchmark in this 
area is PEFA (see http://www.pefa.org) 
the Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability framework which provides 
an external benchmark against which 
countries can assess the comparative and 
absolute health of their systems for public 
finance. And one final aspect of this part 
of benchmarking’s international character 
which warrants mention is the Millennium 
Development Goals (see http://www.
un.org/millenniumgoals) which benchmarks 
whole countries and regions across 
fundamental indicators concerned with 
poverty, health, and education, and which 
provide clear measures to assess ‘whole 
society’ progress.  
Benchmarking’s Modern Idioms:   
Outcomes and Austerity
Whether in the character of a mutant virus 
or an organism adapting sensibly to a new 
environment, benchmarking itself continues 
to evolve and develop.  Two recent aspects 
concern the increasing focus on ‘outcomes’ 
and also the extent to which benchmarking 
can help tackle the modern menace of 
austerity.
As to outcomes, it is very striking that 
‘outcomes’ are now a feature of many 
benchmarking regimes.  For example they 
figure not only in the Australian federal 
experience, but also in the performance 
regimes within devolved parts of the UK, 
notwithstanding the wide difference in 
constitutional arrangements and political 
systems. In part, this has reflected the 
recognition that top-down targets and 
external assessments on public services 
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may distort behaviour, and encourage a 
focus on narrow scoring systems rather 
than the outcomes that matter most to 
citizens and service users. To that extent it 
may be more than just a defensive move 
by those who would rather not have their 
own direct performance scrutinized and 
compared unfavourably. It may instead 
reflect more mature debates and a greater 
understanding about the relationship of 
public services to things that matter for 
people and communities. It may also give 
effect to the generally better capacity 
and capability in public services and 
their delivery, and the vastly improved 
information communication systems that 
now exist. The LGA’s ‘INFORM’ project, for 
example, could probably not have been 
contemplated in quite its current format 
until relatively recently.
One of the current high-water marks of 
an ‘outcomes’ approach is the Single 
Outcome Agreements being implemented 
in Scotland. Not only does it engage the 
‘wicked’ issues that really do matter.  It 
also serves as an instrument to connect 
and align the legitimate aspirations and 
democratic mandates both of local councils 
and of Scottish government ministers, and 
to bind in other key parties as well. It is at a 
relatively early stage of implementation—
especially given how long many important 
outcomes take to achieve.  But it shows 
considerable promise, and has attracted 
a good deal of positive attention in other 
parts of the UK. Importantly, given the 
character of most of the priority public 
services outcomes, it is necessary in 
many cases to treat with proxies and to 
measure intermediate output and process 
indicators as well. Testimony to that is the 
work by local authorities themselves to 
identify relevant indicators and to collect 
and compare quality data to measure 
them is going on in parallel to the broader 
‘outcomes’ approach in Scotland. It is an 
essential underpinning to the broader 
‘outcomes’ based approach. 
So the shift of focus to outcomes does 
not herald a decline in benchmarking so 
much as extend its range still further. It 
also heralds its application to more mature 
appreciations in many different countries 
of the need to measure what is important 
as well as what can be readily quantified 
and compared. By providing linkage 
between inputs, outputs and outcomes 
it also serves potentially to integrate 
internal performance management with 
the external impacts that public services 
organizations strive to deliver. It is no 
panacea, but contains much promise.
solace.org.uk
A further major contemporary challenge 
in both the UK context and many other 
jurisdictions is how to best deploy 
benchmarking in an age of austerity and 
the attendant cuts in public expenditure 
and retrenchment in public services. 
The benchmarking of unit costs may be 
something which is especially useful (and 
perhaps likely to become more common) 
given the pressures on public spending 
in the UK and elsewhere. Unit costs often 
vary widely, for example, between local 
authorities and health trusts, and, worse 
still, sometimes they do not know what their 
unit costs actually are.  Bringing these costs 
into the open in order to ask whether high 
cost services can learn anything from lower 
cost ones is an important contribution for 
benchmarking to make to the austerity 
challenge.
Beyond that, in the UK it is widely 
acknowledged that long-term expenditure 
reductions will have to draw on change 
at the tactical, transactional, and 
transformational levels. At the tactical 
level — tightening efficiency in existing 
services, shrinking eligibility, and so 
on — financial indicators look to be the 
most useful. For transactional change — 
improving systems using ‘lean’ methods or 
better technology, for example — process 
benchmarks are likely to be more relevant. 
But for transformational change — 
tackling the ‘wicked’ issues, for example, 
that cross organisational boundaries, where 
services are being completely re-designed 
around customer needs, or where radical 
reconstruction is called for — probably only 
excellence benchmarking will be of any use 
at all, at least at the initial, innovatory stage 
when the early adopters are struggling at 
the leading edge.  The transformational 
level will increasingly be required, yet it is 
the area in which benchmarking is weakest.  
So as austerity deepens and persists, it is 
difficult to avoid the provisional conclusion 
that benchmarking has potentially less 
relevance than in less turbulent times.
Conditions for Success
Benchmarking is popular partly because 
it is a simple and flexible instrument, 
and one which has shown its capacity to 
be developed and applied to a myriad 
of circumstances and problems. But its 
popularity also owes much to the way it 
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engages some of the most important and 
universal themes of modern public life 
and public services, and in particular the 
way it can serve transparency, trust, and 
accountability. Even if benchmarking is 
not a panacea or a complete answer to 
public services performance, there really 
is no excuse for principled resistance to 
the application of benchmarking to public 
services in order to let funders, citizens, 
users, and fellow service providers know 
how a service is performing.  That is not 
the whole story, of course, but it ought to 
be the starting point, and to underpin the 
many issues of ‘how’, ‘when’, and ‘who’ – 
the issue of ‘whether’ to benchmark should 
not even be on the agenda.  
Beyond that it is important to highlight 
some of the conditions for successful 
benchmarking in addition to those already 
canvassed here, including the  
very important data related issues. Four  
stand out.
First there is the issue of the role of 
professionals. The relationship of the 
professions to benchmarking has been 
very mixed. Some professionals have 
undoubtedly resisted the transparency 
and public scrutiny which accompanies 
benchmarking, and that has not been to 
their credit. It is undoubtedly the case that 
some top-down benchmarking has been 
misconceived and has failed to respect 
the pressures and the problems which 
professionals face on the front line. In 
other cases, however, it has been more a 
question of resistance to accountability 
and legitimate performance assessment. 
Either way, at the heart of professional 
culture at its best is a commitment to 
service and to doing things better, and 
a sense of values which underpins the 
professions generally. If benchmarking can 
engage those values, and that sense of 
professional self-respect which is reinforced 
in the opinions of one’s professional peers, 
that is capable of becoming a powerful 
motivator for the comparison, learning, and 
improvement action which is the essence of 
benchmarking. 
The second is the wider question of 
organisational cultures and the leadership 
which helps to shape and reinforce the 
attitudes and behaviours of all those 
engaged in public service. Leadership 
which is committed to transparency and 
improvement is not a guarantee of a 
culture which is conducive to benefit from 
benchmarking, but in its absence the 
prospects are very slim. Obviously this is 
not just a question of heroic leadership 
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from the top - having the right behaviours 
and attitudes on the part of leaders at 
various levels within the public service 
organisations is critical.
Thirdly, it is difficult to overstate the 
significance of the digital revolution and the 
new environment for public services which 
has been created as a result. That revolution 
has the potential to transform the delivery 
of public services, the relationship between 
services and their users, and the way in 
which services are produced and managed. 
The changes we have already seen are only 
the beginning. The digital revolution has 
been a disruptive technology, in the best 
sense of that word, and benchmarking is 
not always the best instrument to support 
that kind of change. But it also makes 
possible the more effective collection, 
validation, interpretation, and comparison 
of data, and that makes it imperative to 
assess and exploit the potential which  
it carries to conduct benchmarking  
more effectively.
Finally, a critical feature of successful 
benchmarking is whether the authors and 
stewards of a benchmarking regime have a 
clear and coherent theory of improvement. 
This again is a matter of a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for success. 
It is essential to the effective design of 
benchmarking systems that the relationship 
between the indicators chosen, the data to 
support them, the methods and resources 
for interpretation and assessment, and the 
levers for subsequent change, are thought 
through and rest in some kind of organised 
alignment. What is called for is a whole 
system approach, even though the political 
and administrative context in  
which benchmarking systems are 
developed and introduced may not always 
be conducive to that.
Either way, the lesson is fairly clear. It is 
essential to think about and to deploy a 
combination of benchmarking (and other) 
tools from the improvement end of the 
telescope. Adopting an outcome focus, 
policy makers need to ask themselves: 
What do you want to get better? What 
is the current context of change, and 
what are the key relationships and forces 
shaping that context? How do you think 
change will happen — what is your theory 
of improvement? What will be the role of 
benchmarking within that? And how best 
can you optimise that role? 
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This will still not fashion a silver bullet of 
change from the benchmarking tools at 
their disposal, but it will perhaps help to 
ensure that the triggers for improvement 
are more likely to work in the right place 
and in a timely manner.
Key Themes and Future Research  
The UK may be an outlier in the extent and 
nature of benchmarking of public services 
but it is clear that the benchmarking 
of public services is very much an 
international phenomena and that many 
features of performance measurement 
and management of subnational units 
are widely shared across a range of 
jurisdictions. Vertical fiscal imbalance 
is a major impulse to performance 
measurement, but data problems and 
issues bedevil comparison and inhibit 
clear causal analysis of why things go 
right or wrong and how they might best 
be copied or fixed. In the turbulent world 
of politics and public services the line 
between positive criticism and destructive 
blame is continually negotiated, as is the 
constant flux around self-regulatory and 
more incentivised and interventionist 
arrangements. But there are now visible 
performance regimes in many jurisdictions, 
underpinned by explicit or implicit theories 
of improvement, conveying complex and 
multiple purposes which are not always 
well related to the benchmarking systems 
they underpin. Effective comparison at a 
horizontal level and conducted voluntarily 
is difficult enough, but when overlaid by the 
multiple and intersecting accountabilities 
between national and subnational orders of 
government, and between government and 
the citizenry, the landscape becomes ever 
more turbulent and difficult to negotiate.
For all the effort and energy devoted to 
benchmarking, it remains an instrument 
of improvement which is still developing 
and evolving. Its’ significance more than 
justifies a future research agenda, and from 
our work we have distilled six interwoven 
themes which warrant further enquiry.
The first of these is the need to capture 
the evolving landscape of benchmarking 
and external performance assessment 
both across the UK and in comparative 
jurisdictions. We have already seen 
significant developments in the U.K.’s 
devolved context, and benchmarking 
systems are evolving both in developed 
and developing countries across the 
world. What is required in part is both a 
narrative and analytical account which is 
capable of recording the flux and variation 
as benchmarking systems and theories 
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of improvement change or are engulfed 
by tsunamis of service crisis and political 
preference. The UK offers a special promise 
in the natural laboratory of public service 
which has emerged, but both in the UK 
and more broadly there is an opportunity 
to apply, test, extend and refine the key 
concepts and lessons of the benchmarking 
landscape.
Secondly, we need more empirical 
evidence on the impact of benchmarking 
systems. We need to develop a better 
understanding of what works, for what 
purposes, how, when, and why, and with 
what spillovers and opportunity costs. The 
limited evidence available suggests that 
benchmarking systems based on hierarchy, 
targets, and reputational effects have the 
most impact on performance improvement. 
However, they are very unpopular and 
are likely to have limited lives. Is there 
some way to get the benefit without the 
downside?
The third area is that of the multiple and 
crosscutting accountabilities which operate 
within public services in democratic 
jurisdictions. Local authorities have their 
own local democratic mandate, but often 
this is one which has at best an imperfect 
relationship to the wishes and needs of the 
citizens who they serve given low election 
turn outs and the unaligned relationship 
between the responsibilities of local 
authorities and their tax and revenue base. 
At the higher (or different) level of state 
or central government, the issue is not 
simply that this may be the source of some 
or all of the funding for public services 
delivered at local level, although that in 
itself might be thought justification enough 
to require measurement, comparison, and 
improvement. More significantly, many of 
the services delivered at state or local level 
are of legitimate interest to other levels 
of government as a consequence of the 
democratic mandates which they also hold. 
Defensiveness and political difference 
may well intrude on what might otherwise 
be a natural partnership of interest in 
understanding comparative performance 
and making it better. Either way, this is 
a potentially significant area for future 
research interest.
Next, there is the question of the role of 
citizens and service users in benchmarking. 
In practice, these are often only marginal 
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participants in many benchmarking 
systems. They may well be surveyed 
for their views on service quality and 
performance, but they are rarely involved 
in discussions about what the indicators 
should be, what they mean, and what 
should happen and change as a result 
of benchmarking results. There may also 
be scope for incorporating softer forms 
of intelligence about service quality 
and performance into benchmarking 
systems by using social media. Clearly, 
this communication and presentational 
dimensional is very relevant to ‘armchair 
auditors’, but there is a significant question 
mark as to whether they actually exist, and 
if they do then how their audits can be 
made more effective.
Fifthly, there is the relationship between 
politics, politicians, and benchmarking. 
In many ways this is a marriage made in 
both heaven and hell, and with the media 
as the key witness. Benchmarking can 
underpin the critical political accountability 
to which all public services should be 
subject. However there is a major issue 
in the problem of political time horizons, 
and media drivers. Between them they 
always risk turning a question of legitimate 
accountability into one of blame and point 
scoring. Great benchmarking requires 
tremendous political self-discipline, and 
a maturity of view which is not always 
in evidence. Indeed, natural features 
of government and politics may be in 
fundamental contradiction with what 
appears to be important principles of 
benchmarking, at least in the medium 
or long-term. For example, one naturally 
looks to a comparative time-series of 
performance data to inform an assessment 
of progress and relative improvement. But 
the vagaries of politics and government 
may mean that at best a benchmarking 
system will have a shelf life of at best a few 
years. The UK experience suggests that 3 to 
4 years is about the limit in the modern era. 
And yet, what if the medium and long term 
never arrives, nor is ever really intended to 
arrive? And what if a series of successive 
approximations and short-term gains were 
the only significant game in town?
Finally, there is the major question of 
whether sector led approaches of self 
regulation and comparison can deliver 
improvement consistently without 
constant or at least occasional injections 
of top-down discipline and incentives. 
The early work in some areas has been 
promising in part, albeit that the timescales 
for establishing voluntary schemes 
of benchmarking in the public sector 
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appear to be very lengthy.  A key issue 
will therefore be whether having had such 
thorough preparation they then deliver 
strong results and endure over the medium 
to long term.  But there are also continuing 
concerns as to whether essentially 
voluntaristic approaches sufficiently involve 
the public, or have enough by way of 
intelligence to detect and address risk, or 
enable a properly joined up approach to 
be taken to public services performance 
assessment. Voluntaristic approaches also 
raise difficult issues about the use and 
relevance of data for different audiences, 
and the different mandates which they 
bring to their use of that data. All of this 
takes us back again to the importance 
of understanding the ecologies and 
the impacts of benchmarking systems, 
and the way in which they are assessed 
and reviewed, and the way in which 
accountability deficits for public services 
in democratic jurisdictions can best be 
identified and rectified.
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In 2001, the U.S. Congress passed the 
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) to 
boost student academic achievement, 
a top-down benchmarking strategy 
par excellence.  Yet Congress’ choice 
of benchmarking rather than national 
standards, exams, curriculum, or direct 
spending illustrates the complex 
and unpredictable relationship 
between federalism and public policy. 
Benchmarking was virtually the only choice 
available to Congress. The American 
experience with federal education policy 
is notable because, first, benchmarks 
are used to address a national education 
policy problem in a country with almost 
no national educational capacity. Second, 
Congress arrived at benchmarks only after 
the states had co-opted previous national 
legislation. Third, NCLB’s benchmarking 
was developed in the face of opposition 
from many of those states. Yet, despite 
these challenges, top-down benchmarking 
has unquestionably refocused American 
education on the national education 
agenda at the expense of federalism.
Offering American states federal monies 
in return for pursuing federal policy 
prescriptions is virtually the only lever the 
national government has over education 
policy. Education policy in the United 
States is primarily a local affair, and the 
federal government has little ability to 
gather educational data, develop policy 
alternatives, or effect change directly. 
Despite recent federal advances in the 
area, states and localities still contribute 
90 percent of all educational revenues 
(Zhou 2010). The federal government’s 
Benchmarking Inequality: 
Measuring education progress 
in American education
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primary involvement in elementary and 
secondary education came only in 1965 
and only after President Lyndon Johnson 
and Commissioner of Education Francis 
Keppel circumvented the issue by tying 
$1.3 billion to low-income students rather 
than to schools ¡ª through the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), 
the forerunner of NCLB (McGuinn 2006, 
p. 30). At the time, federal policymakers 
believed that school spending was the 
primary driver of unequal educational 
opportunities, a view suggested by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) (see Reynolds 2007). So 
long as schools spent federal money to 
aid low-income students, they were free 
to design their own educational programs 
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as they wished, and schools could refuse 
the money. Thus, the federal government’s 
attempt to improve educational 
opportunity depended wholly on state and 
school district willingness and capacity to 
do so.
This precedent was ill-suited to address 
the emerging problem of student 
achievement. In the thirty years after 
ESEA, it became painfully clear to most 
state and federal policymakers that simply 
boosting spending would not produce 
educational equality in any meaningful 
sense. As early as 1966, troubling data 
showed a vast gulf in student achievement 
among racial groups some as large as a 
standard deviation in test scores (Coleman 
et al. 1996). Despite achievement gains 
for all racial groups over time, that gap 
has persisted into the 2000s (McCall et al. 
2006). 
When Congress attempted to shift federal 
focus from spending to achievement in 
the 1994 reauthorization of ESEA (known 
as the Improving America’s Schools 
Act), federal policymakers saw low and 
divergent state education standards as a 
root cause of disparities in achievement, 
and many of them, including Presidents 
George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, 
supported the creation of national 
standards. But advocates of American 
federalism undermined coherent national 
education policy (Ravitch and Schlesinger 
1996). Despite a rousing fight over national 
history standards (which came to nothing), 
federal law required states to create 
standards, assessments, and reporting of 
results. For the first time, federal money 
would be dependent on classroom content 
rather than student characteristics, but 
states still controlled standard setting and 
evaluation. State capacity remained the 
fulcrum on which federal policy rested (see 
Manna 2006).
The high-stakes benchmarking 
characteristic of NCLB came only after 
states had co-opted previous legislation. 
Through the 1990s, many states designed 
diffuse standards, created unclear metrics 
of success, set low bars to pass state 
exams, and occasionally excused low-
performing students from taking the exams 
at all. By 1999, federal policymakers argued 
that states were subverting the spirit, if 
not the letter, of ESEA (McGuinn 2006, 
pp. 134¨C45). In response, policymakers 
adopted stringent benchmarks in No 
Child Left Behind to overcome the states’ 
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foot-dragging. NCLB created a bold, if 
simplistic, measure of success. Student 
exam performance would be categorized 
as below basic, basic, proficient, or 
advanced. Exams would be given in at 
least reading and math every year from the 
third to the eighth grade and once in high 
school. At least 95 percent of students in 
each demographic subgroup would take 
the exams, and, at the end of the 2013¨C14 
school year, all students must reach the 
proficient level or schools would risk 
losing federal funds (Manna 2006, p. 128). 
Further, these benchmarks would be widely 
disseminated to parents and the press. 
Federal policymakers argued that publicly-
reported benchmarks with common labels 
would weaken states’ ability to skirt student 
achievement, essentially shaming them into 
adopting the federal government’s focus 
on academic outputs rather than revenue 
inputs.
NCLB’s benchmarks were developed in 
spite of states’ commitment to improve 
academic achievement. Indeed, they were 
developed to force that commitment; 
and the federal “stick” has proven an 
uneven motivator. This is evident in both 
state-reported student proficiency levels 
and standards for teacher quality. In 
2009, the federal government compared 
state standards to federal standards for 
the National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP), a national exam. The 
NAEP standard score for eighth-grade 
mathematics for proficiency was 299 
that year. In comparison, Massachusetts’ 
proficient standard was more challenging 
than the federal standard, at 300; 
Wisconsin’s was 262; and Tennessee’s at 
229 below the federal standard for “basic” 
(Bandeira de Mello 2011)! States also report 
divergent percentages of highly-qualified 
teachers. In 2005, Wisconsin claimed 99.5 
percent of its core classes were taught by 
highly-qualified teachers, Massachusetts 
claimed 93 percent, and California 74 
percent (Carey 2006, p. 18). It is apparent 
that states are not speaking the same 
language nor have the same educational 
priorities as the federal government. 
Despite these variations, the Obama 
Administration extended benchmarking to 
teacher quality by insisting that teachers 
be partly evaluated on student test scores 
(U.S. Department of Education 2010, p. 14). 
But even here, the Administration had to 
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bow to federalist realities and found it had 
to promise states a waiver from elements 
of No Child Left Behind in order to gain 
their participation in further benchmarking 
(Cavanagh and Klein 2012). Many states 
have opted to ignore the offer.
Despite these obstacles, there is little 
doubt that NCLB’s benchmarking has 
successfully “shamed” states into a 
fundamental re-orientation of their 
educational programs. While some 
legislators continue to talk about 
increasing teacher pay, reducing class 
sizes, or boosting teachers’ professional 
development, no state policymaker 
publicly contests that academic 
performance is a central purpose of 
schooling (Shober 2012). States and schools 
do respond to public grading of their 
performance, and spend significant time 
defending decreases in NCLB ratings.  
Teachers’ unions, long staunch opponents 
of public ratings, have acquiesced to 
benchmarking, too. In 2010, the president 
of the American Federation of Teachers 
allowed that “student test scores . . . should 
also be considered” when evaluating 
teachers (Weingarten 2010). NCLB 
also prompted states to take defensive 
measures against the future beginning as 
forty-five states quickly signed on to a new, 
state-driven consortium in 2010 and 2011 
to develop common, national academic 
standards and assessments the very reform 
their advocates scuttled in 1994 (Common 
Core State Standards Initiative 2012). 
Benchmarking brought together what 
federalism kept apart.
Arnold F. Shober is Associate Professor of 
Government at Lawrence University, USA.
solace.org.uk
Bandeira de Mello, V. (2011), Mapping State 
Proficiency Standards Onto NAEP Scales: 
Variation and Change in State Standards for 
Reading and Mathematics 2005-2009 (National 
Center for Education Statistics, Washington, DC).
Carey, K. (2006), Hot Air: How States Inflate 
Their Educational Progress Under NCLB 
(Education Sector, Washington, DC).
Cavanagh, S. and Klein, A. (2012), Broad 
changes ahead as NCLB waivers roll out. 
Education Week (9 February).
Coleman, J., Campbell, E., Hobson, C., 
McPartland, J., Mood, A., Weinfeld, F., 
and York, R. (1966), Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, 
Washington, DC).
Common Core State Standards Initiative 
(2012), Common Core State Standards (Author, 
Washington, DC). http://www.corestandards.org/.
Manna, P. (2006), School’s In: Federalism and 
the National Education Agenda (Georgetown 
University Press, Washington, DC).
McCall, M., Houser, C., Cronin, J., Kingsbury, 
G. and Houser, R. (2006), Achievement Gaps: 
An Examination of Differences in Student 
Achievement and Growth (Northwest Evaluation 
Association, Lake Oswego, OR).
McGuinn, P. (2006), No Child Left Behind 
and the Transformation of Federal Education 
Policy, 1965-2005 (The University Press of Kansas, 
Lawrence, KS).
Patterson, J. (2001), Brown v. Board of 
Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its 
Troubled Legacy (Oxford University Press, New 
York).
Ravitch, D. and Schlesinger, A. (1996), The 
new, improved history standards. Wall Street 
Journal (3 April).
Reynolds, L. (2007), Uniformity of taxation 
and the preservation of local control in school 
finance reform. University of California Davis Law 
Review, 40, 5, pp. 1835¨C1895.
Shober, A. (2012), From Teacher Education to 
Student Progress:Teacher Quality Since NCLB 
(AEI, Washington, DC).
U.S. Department of Education (2010), A 
Blueprint for Reform (Author, Washington, DC). 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/
blueprint.pdf.
Weingarten, R. (2010), A new path forward: 
four approaches to quality teaching and better 
schools. Speech, Washington, DC (12 January). 
http://aft.3cdn.net/227d12e668432ca48e_
twm6b90k1.pdf. 
Zhou, L. (2010), Revenues and Expenditures 
for Public Elementary and Secondary Education: 
School Year 2007¨C08 (Washington, DC, 
National Center for Education Statistics).
19
Sector-led improvement is currently 
seen as the way forward. Abolishing the 
Comprehensive Area Assessment and 
the Audit Commission, the UK Coalition 
Government declared that local authorities 
should be responsible for their own 
improvement and be held accountable by 
their local communities and electorate.   
Local government welcomed this radical 
change and the Local Government 
Association has staked out its claim on the 
improvement territory. 
The idea has obvious attractions – 
particularly in local services which are 
governed by elected politicians. A local 
approach should make for a better 
alignment of statutory powers with service 
responsibilities, and generate cost savings 
by reducing the administrative burden 
associated with topdown performance 
regimes. Given the magnitude of budget 
cuts, it gives authorities the flexibility to 
make tough choices locally. So sector led 
improvement is an idea whose time has 
finally come. 
Or has it? From its inception, some services 
were considered too important to be 
left to local government alone. Ofsted 
remains responsible for inspecting schools 
and ‘high risk’ children’s services. The 
Care Quality Commission inspects the 
continuum of social care. So rather better 
evidence would be helpful in clarifying 
what is meant by this term, and identifying 
some of the conditions for its success. 
Here I draw some reflections about the 
particular features and consequences 
associated with a sector led model for 
improvement initiated in Ontario. Charged 
with promoting the sustainability of the 
Choosing to get better?
A Canadian perspective on sector-led 
improvement in local children’s services
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child welfare system in Ontario, as one 
of three Commissioners I gained some 
insights into the questions posed by 
sector led improvement.  In different ways, 
this experience at times confirms and 
challenges what we think we know and 
have come to expect about improving 
public services.
The position in Canada
In places like Canada new public 
management never really caught on. 
By UK standards the public is quite tolerant 
and even fond of their public services 
(though becoming decidedly grumpy 
about its health services). As responsibility 
for child welfare services rests with the 
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provinces, the federal government has 
largely left them to account for themselves 
rather than adopting national standards 
or systems of measurement. In Ontario, 
services such as education and health have 
been the subject of some limited standard 
setting and performance reporting. 
However this is not the case for child 
welfare services which are delivered by 
forty-six (46) independently governed 
Children’s Aid Societies (CAS), mandated 
and funded by the Ontario government 
through the Ministry of Children and  
Youth Services (MCYS). Despite 
engagement with quality assurance 
programs and longstanding collaboration 
developing outcome measures, little 
hard data is available that reveals much 
of importance about the performance of 
the child welfare system as a whole and its 
impact on children. 
The paradox is that where governments 
have taken a traditional administrative 
approach, such as in many Canadian 
provinces, layers of process requirements 
have accumulated year after year. These 
requirements obscure the services’ social 
purpose and client benefit. Consequently, 
little reliable information about results or 
clients is available despite the multiple 
and time consuming reporting up the line 
on compliance to standard processes, 
timeframes, expenditure audits and case-
level checking. 
Ontario decided to establish an arms-
length Commission to tackle its concerns 
about the child welfare sector’s spending 
and performance. An arms-length body, 
reasonably resourced, can provide some 
leadership, expertise and the discretion 
afforded by its independence from 
government and sector provider. However 
ultimately it must act through others, and 
for the Commission working with the sector 
offered the shortest and most effective 
route to achieving tangible improvements 
for children’s services. 
The flipside of independence of course 
is the challenge of developing a system 
of performance measurement and 
improvement without the legitimacy of 
Ministerially sanctioned priorities. As 
we sought to define measures to reflect 
progress on what were thought to be key 
government policies, many proved to be 
insufficiently clear or in conflict with other 
requirements. It was difficult to reconcile 
a policy of ‘differential response’ with 
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compliance to all aspects of the statutory 
protection standards, for example. It was 
also impossible to honour commitments 
made to First Nations children and 
communities without an agreed form of 
headcount monitoring, or to hold CAS 
accountable for reducing admissions of 
children into care when the upstream 
services of early intervention and family 
support were delivered by a patchwork of 
other agencies with no duty to collaborate. 
A sector-led approach
Government exists to assume a strategic 
and systemic role. Better that it spend 
its political capital on achieving its 
policies, priorities and social value, and 
leave agencies the responsibility for 
managing their internal processes and 
accounts. This may be a major change for 
provincial governments which are more 
occupied with day-to-day operations and 
enforcement of probity rules. An arms 
length body such as the Commission may 
play a part in this transition. 
Of course at the core of the idea of sector 
led improvement is sector leadership, 
and most sectors are organised through 
a membership association. The Ontario 
Association of Children’s Aid Societies 
(OACAS) took on this leadership, well-
served by a committed band of child 
welfare and measurement experts. It 
set up a sector advisory group for the 
commission, an indispensable advocate 
and arbitrator. The strengths are those 
well-rehearsed by advocates of a sector-
led approach - buy-in, commitment, 
specialist expertise, member’s hands on 
role in service delivery, local accountability 
to community and clients. Together with 
the Commission, it was possible to make 
the case for using performance data and 
benchmarking (dumb data) to foster the 
culture of curiosity and learning necessary 
to deliver improvement. 
With the combined efforts of the 
OACAS, technical database support, the 
Commission, and supportive funding,  
quite remarkable progress was made.  
A list of child-centered, events-driven 
indicators were adopted (after much 
discussion), a technical guide produced, 
data from multiple IT systems was 
downloaded and matched, and  
preliminary reports were produced. 
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Despite some obstacles along the way, all 
this was done in a few short months. The 
question for the future must be whether 
collaborative relationships are sufficiently 
resilient to sustain the transition to greater 
transparency , public reporting and the 
‘accountability agreements’ that the 
Ontario government is now introducing. 
Key issues
A major feature of membership 
associations is reconciling their 
consensual decision-making style with 
their commitment to raising the service 
quality provided by all their members. 
Associations are voluntary affiliations, and 
when put to the test members can opt out 
or simply change their mind at any point in 
the process. So voluntary affiliation can rest 
uncomfortably with consensual leadership 
and claims to champion improvement. 
When the stakes are high and members are 
withholding their consent or threatening 
to withdraw, a sector association may 
have to choose between remaining loyal 
to its voluntary nature and run with the 
willing, or becoming comfortable with a 
more exclusive club that makes adherence 
to benchmarking and improvement a 
condition of membership. Yet the less 
willing may also include the least able and 
poorest performers. 
Data consistency is another challenge even 
for the most controlling of performance 
models, but it is a perennial problem for 
voluntary benchmarking systems. When 
the performance indicators are developed 
and adopted by consensus within the 
sector by its members, the risk is that they 
can be constantly subject to review. At 
best such review and revision may improve 
the measures but it may also undermine 
their value and credibility if not managed 
well. More powerful sector players cannot 
be seen to exert undue influence to gain 
agreement to indicators on which they 
perform well. Every change of indicator 
also means a break in the time series and 
significant system costs. The appetite 
for revising and designing new measures 
sometimes seems insatiable. 
Many factors feature in how sector led 
improvement works. The experience of 
the Ontario child welfare sector highlights 
what can be achieved in collaboration with 
an independent Commission, supported 
by technical expertise and government 
solace.org.uk
funding. No doubt the ‘shadow of 
hierarchy’ and the risk of more muscular 
and top down performance management 
was never far from this project. In this 
sense, it may be that the distinction 
between ‘sector led’ improvement and 
‘top-down command and control’ is 
more tactical than scientific, a voluntary 
choice made in conditions not entirely of 
our choosing. Nonetheless, there is real 
value in encouraging accountability and 
improvement, and one that itself sees the 
value of comparison in doing so.
Dr Wendy Thomson is Professor of 
Social Work and Social Policy at McGill 
University, Canada.
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In recent years there has been an 
unprecedented increase in the scale, scope 
and significance of external assessment 
and benchmarking of public services. 
It is a transnational phenomenon with 
profound implications for management 
practices around the globe. Processes 
of performance assessment and 
benchmarking have even attracted strong 
interest in federal systems such as Australia 
and Canada. The Australian case highlights 
differences in approach associated  
with the fundamental character of 
governmental and public services 
systems. But it also highlights the 
interesting degree of convergence of 
methods across disparate jurisdictions. 
Much (though not all) of public service 
benchmarking is vertically and horizontally 
intergovernmental. 
On the vertical axis, it involves a central 
government mandating and/or facilitating 
in some way performance reporting by 
regional or local governments. On the 
horizontal axis it involves the implicit 
or explicit comparison of performance 
between the individual jurisdictions 
(regional or local governments). This 
potentially creates problems, but in unitary 
states, where sovereignty is concentrated 
in the national government, the central 
government occupies a position of 
superiority both constitutional and fiscal 
vis-à-vis the regional or local authorities 
it is directing. The question is usually less 
whether that direction is legitimate, but 
rather, whether it is effective.
In federal systems, however, the 
constituent units are sovereign 
Benchmarking in  
a federal context
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governments in their own right, and 
the idea that central governments 
could mandate intergovernmental 
benchmarking of functions that lie within 
the jurisdiction of the constituent units is 
alien. Central governments may promote 
intergovernmental benchmarking, but  
little more.
However, in centralized federations the 
national government enjoys a more 
directive position. Australia is one such 
case, and it is a case where performance 
monitoring is now well established. It 
demonstrates the convergence that 
is taking place around benchmarking 
between a number of federal and non-
federal jurisdictions.
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The States and the Commonwealth
Australia’s Commonwealth government 
exercises considerable authority over the 
country’s six states—primarily because of 
its fiscal dominance. Most service delivery 
responsibilities are the responsibility of the 
states, but the Commonwealth controls 
most of the major tax bases and over 
the years has developed a substantial 
appetite for policy-setting in those areas 
of state jurisdiction. The states rely on 
central government transfers for half of 
their revenue needs, and they are subject 
to wide-ranging policy direction through 
conditional grants. In response to the 
high degree of entanglement and overlap 
that has resulted, Australian federalism 
has increasingly developed a network of 
intergovernmental machinery whereby the 
two levels of government ‘cooperate’.
At the apex of that system is an 
institutionalized system of heads of 
government meetings called ‘COAG’:  
the Council of Australian Governments.
Australia’s Report on  
Government Services
For most the 20th century, there was 
no formalized comparison of state 
performance across Australia. Each state 
was accountable to its own citizens. The 
very broad push to put the Australian 
economy on a more open and competitive 
footing in the 1980s and early 1990s 
required the two levels of government to 
develop much more collaborative relations. 
As part of that, Australia’s governments 
launched a comprehensive arrangement 
for performance reporting of service 
delivery by the states and territories known 
as ‘ROGS’—the Report on Government 
Services.  This is an annual compendium of 
performance data collated and published 
centrally. First produced in 1995, ROGS 
has been published every year since, 
broadening, deepening and improving 
from iteration to iteration. Currently, it 
covers 14 service domains comprising 
23 specific services representing ‘over 
two-thirds of total government recurrent 
expenditure’ in Australia.
The success of ROGS has been attributed 
to the collaborative and consensual 
way it was established and continues 
to operate. It is produced under the 
direction of a steering committee on 
which sit representatives from each of the 
participating governments and which is 
chaired independently. The Productivity 
Commission produces the report and 
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plays an important role as ‘honest broker’. 
Unsurprisingly, part of ROGS’ success 
has been its avoidance of aggregate 
performance indicators or league table 
type reporting. ROGS is primarily a tool for 
government, not the public.  The focus is 
on the data, with some contextualization 
to make inter-jurisdictional comparison 
more meaningful. Champions of ROGS 
point to where the report seems to have 
helped instigate or promote broader 
adoption of good policy but there is only 
a weak connexion between the findings in 
ROGS and the political and policy process. 
There is little by way of accountability 
mechanisms to ensure performance 
reporting becomes performance 
improvement.
Outcomes Focus
ROGS initially evaluated ‘cost-
effectiveness’, meaning that both efficiency 
and outcomes data would be required. 
Over time, the emphasis on outcomes 
has been increased and equity has 
been inserted as a third criterion. At the 
same time, ROGS notes the continuing 
importance of output indicators. ROGS 
has benefited from the iterative nature of 
the process, with data quality and range 
improving over time. 
To help drive that improvement, ROGS 
has always followed the approach of 
publishing data even if not all jurisdictions 
are participating. The ROGS experience 
has been that no jurisdiction wants to be 
seen as not participating and so the gaps 
are soon filled.
But this is now old news. Recent 
developments in Australian federalism 
have built on that framework in an attempt 
to consolidate a regime of outcomes-
focused inter-jurisdictional benchmarking. 
Australia is well into a second generation 
version of its intergovernmental 
benchmarking scheme. This has involved 
an escalation of the regime rather than 
merely revision or remodelling. The reason 
for this was a major reform of Australia’s 
system of intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers in 2009 that involved a retreat 
from the high degree of implementation 
conditionality traditionally characteristic of 
Commonwealth grants to the states, and 
the shift instead to a more arm’s-length 
outcomes accountability. 
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A new body, the COAG Reform Council, 
now analyses the data to assess how states 
are performing in regard to their outcomes 
targets as part of the intergovernmental 
machinery of ‘co-operative federalism’ in 
Australia.
The targets are a mixture of outputs 
and outcomes desiderata. In health, 
for instance, targets include such 
predictable—and manageable—output 
indicators as waiting times for elective 
surgery and availability of aged care 
accommodation. However, they also 
include such broad outcomes objectives 
as ‘incidence of selected cancers’, 
‘prevalence of  overweight and obesity’ 
and ‘levels of risky alcohol consumption’. 
It is relatively early days for this new 
outcomes-based regime and the results 
are very mixed and reveal that in many 
areas no progress is being made. The 
big question is policy impact, and here 
utilization has been the Achilles’ heel, 
with little evidence that governments are 
improving their performance in response. 
The new performance reporting process 
has certainly ‘upped the ante’, but not 
sufficiently it would seem to give the 
system real political traction.
Alan Fenna is Professor of Government 
at Curtin University, Australia.
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Many countries are under increasing 
pressure to either build or sustain a system 
of evaluation anchoring on government 
program performance and  this movement 
has already spread into many developing 
countries, such as India, Malaysia and 
Sri Lanka.  China is not immune to this 
globalization of performance evaluation 
movement.
In 2003, Guangdong Province became 
the first provincial government of China to 
experiment with performance evaluation 
and budgeting. But performance oriented 
efforts are still in its infancy in China. Since 
the mid-1990s, the State Council of China 
has incorporated project performance 
evaluation in their administrative review and 
approval of projects. By 2008, according to 
the Chinese Public Administration Society, 
one third of the provincial governments 
have experimented with various models of 
performance evaluation. In addition, the 
local governments are, in an unprecedented 
way, using performance information in their 
decision making. The City of Hangzhou, 
the capital city of ZheJiang Province in 
the economically developed eastern 
part of China, for instance, demoted 
the director of its Drug Control Bureau 
because the performance of the Bureau 
was consecutively rated as unsatisfactory in 
serving the public.
An effective performance evaluation 
system, however, has never been built 
overnight. Given that the basic governance 
structure in developing countries is often 
incomplete, introducing performance 
evaluations in these countries is especially 
Unlocking the Black Box: 
Performance Evaluation  
Practices in China
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full of challenges. What seems to be 
happening in China is a vibrant and fluid 
situation on the ground. The demand for 
an ‘evaluation’ of performance evaluation in 
China is high.
The study of performance evaluations in 
China is also under-developed. The subjects 
fall under either program/organizational 
performance evaluations or personnel 
performance evaluations. The existing 
research can be categorized as ‘western 
experience-centered’ research and  
‘Chinese experience-centered’ research. 
In the first group, some studies elaborate 
on the western experience of performance 
evaluation and call for more performance 
evaluations in China. 
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The key questions are: what is performance 
evaluation as implemented in the western 
countries? And can it be ‘exported’ to 
China?  On the other hand, ‘Chinese 
experience-centered’ research focuses 
on an evaluation of Chinese government 
activities and/or provokes thoughts on how 
to conduct performance evaluations and 
management in a Chinese way. 
A Case Study:  Zhejiang Province
Zhejiang Province has also experimented 
with performance evaluation practice.  
Between 2006 and 2008, the Province has 
promulgated a series of major executive 
orders/reports regarding performance 
evaluation, and Zhejiang is one of the 
leaders in the country on this regard.  
Seventeen official performance evaluation 
reports of budget outcomes were obtained 
and analysed, and  interviews were 
conducted with 20 government employees.  
Their comments were then content analyzed 
to tease out the patterns in their perception 
of the effectiveness of performance 
evaluation and the usage of this  
information in decision making. 
Performance evaluation in China involves at 
least three groups of people: the requester, 
evaluatee, and evaluator. The requesters 
ask performance evaluation to be done. In 
general, performance evaluations are done 
at the request of a finance department, 
a supervising department and/or a 
department itself (self-evaluation). 
The evaluatees in this sample consist of 
both organizations and projects. Therefore, 
the two most common forms of evaluations 
are organizational performance evaluations 
and project-based evaluations. Overall, 
62% of the evaluators are government 
employees, 34 % third party evaluators 
(with the majority being accountants) and 
4% academics. A wider range of evaluators 
was found than expected, going beyond 
government employees, including using 
third parties to conduct performance 
evaluations  - a departure from China’s 
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traditionally hierarchical evaluation system 
that tends to be internally driven. 
The evaluation reports contain three major 
components: project description, evaluation 
results and recommendations. A rather 
consistent measurement structure consists 
of four kinds of evaluative categories: Goal 
Quality Assessment, Goal Obtainment, 
Funds Management and Financial Capacity. 
The second category (Goal Obtainment) 
is the key part. Depending on the projects 
being evaluated, goals consist of both 
operational (output) and social impact 
(outcome) indicators. For instance, a street 
overhaul project was evaluated in terms 
of both the kilometers of streets being 
overhauled (output) and the promotion of 
city image (outcome). In addition to results-
based evaluation, the majority of the reports 
(93%) contained the assessment of staff, 
management and institutional support level 
for goal fulfillment. 
The reports made clear that the purpose of 
doing so was to gauge the organizational 
management capacity in the hope to 
indicate managerial areas of improvement. 
Another somewhat surprising finding is 
that although the assessment of citizen 
satisfaction is not yet a regularly utilized tool 
in the feedback loop of the government 
decision making process, 40% of the reports 
used some kind of target population 
feedback mechanism as part of the 
evaluative efforts. 
Interestingly, the majority of the reports 
(about three quarters) received high 
points (90 and above), and the interviews 
confirmed that no interviewee could identify 
a case where performance evaluation 
scored poorly. This may indicate a degree of 
caution and immaturity in the instrument of 
performance evaluation. 
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Conclusion
China is in the early developing stage of 
performance evaluations in a larger context 
where 1) centralized governance is in place, 
2) various reform initiatives are taking 
shape, and 3) the boundaries of scientific 
evaluations and the potential usefulness of 
performance evaluations within its political 
environment are unknown. These conditions 
are not unique to China. Many developing 
countries are in similar situations. The 
literature on performance evaluation and 
management stresses the importance of 
the performance system being politically 
feasible and technically sound in order for it 
to be successfully implemented. 
China’s approach seems to address the 
former (politically feasible) by legitimizing 
performance evaluations through issuing 
executive call letters and to enhance the 
latter (technically sound) by positioning the 
finance department to provide substantial 
amounts of central guidance. Of course 
the introduction of performance related 
evaluations in transitional countries may 
be a critical contribution to building up 
a professional public service and the 
development of viable government 
institutions, or an extra burden on already 
over-burdened staffs and a diversion from 
more urgent issues. China is still in the 
process of finding out which it will be for 
them, but there is no doubt that a start has 
been made.
Elaine Yi Lu is Associate Professor in the 
Department of Public Management, John 
Jay College of Criminal Justice, the City 
University of New York, USA.
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Improving performance across public 
services is a consistent aim for government 
and a focus for ongoing programmes of 
reform. How to best manage public services 
in order to achieve such improvement is 
both highly politically contentious and the 
subject of much academic debate and 
research. 
Various models of governance have been 
proposed, implemented and evaluated, but 
it is often difficult to distinguish precisely 
which aspects of such models have had a 
positive impact on performance due to two 
reasons: the usual lack of a control group 
for the counterfactual, and the typical 
introduction of a multifaceted reform at 
the same time. In this article we draw on 
the results of two ‘natural experiments’ that 
circumvent both those problems, and thus 
provide robust evidence on the effects on 
the performance of alternative models of 
governance for schools and hospitals.
Both these natural experiments exploit 
the Labour government’s devolution of 
powers to Wales in 1999, which led to the 
Welsh Assembly seeking to create ‘clear 
red water’ in its policies for school and 
hospital governance. Prior to devolution 
there were similar legislative, institutional, 
funding and governance arrangements 
in both countries. Devolution led to a 
divergence in governance systems for both 
hospitals and schools; much else remained 
unchanged. This enables us to isolate the 
impact of the changes to one country’s 
governance structures, using the other as 
the counterfactual. 
Does ‘naming and shaming’ work? 
The impact of transparent public ranking 
on hospital and school performance
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For schools, the natural experiment is 
provided by the abolition of school league 
tables by the Welsh Assembly government 
in 2001. Prior to that point league tables 
had been a fixture of both Welsh and 
English schools’ governance since the 
early 1990s, providing a high-profile, 
transparent public ranking of schools’ 
comparative performance across a range 
of measures, predominantly based on test 
score outcomes. These transparent public 
rankings (TPR) were used as part of a range 
of governance structures: they informed 
parental choice and encouraged schools 
to compete as part of a quasi-market, while 
also being used to set targets and identify 
‘failing’ schools, with subsequent sanctions 
sometimes attached. 
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This system has continued in England. After 
league tables were abolished in Wales the 
data was still collected and used by schools 
and local authorities. What stopped was 
the very public, high-stakes nature of 
that information, with a shift to increased 
reliance on trusting the schools to use it 
to improve without the need for explicit 
intervention. Wales essentially shifted from 
TPR to a governance model based on trust 
and altruism (T&A)
So what was the effect of school league 
table abolition in Wales on educational 
outcomes? Our econometric study, using 
census data from all non-selective, state 
schools in England and Wales, found that 
there was a negative impact on school 
performance in Wales relative to England 
by almost two GCSE grades per student 
per year. This effect was concentrated in 
the lower 75% of schools (as measured by 
student prior attainment and by poverty), 
with the poorest and lowest average  
ability schools falling behind the most. 
These results were not driven by English 
schools gaming the league tables after 
2001, and were mirrored by results 
for English and Welsh schools in the 
independent PISA tests. The results did  
not vary by degree of competition; a point 
to which we return below.
We can similarly categorise the natural 
experiment that occurred with the 
introduction of ‘star rating’ NHS hospitals in 
England from 2000 to 2005. After winning 
the 1997 election, the Labour Government 
abandoned the previous administration’s 
quasi-market for T&A. Prior to devolution, 
the NHS in Wales had similar policies and 
practice to those in England, and the Welsh 
government continued with the model of 
T&A following devolution. 
In 2000 the English government abandoned 
T&A and introduced a ‘star rating’ system 
– TPR for hospitals. Star ratings gave NHS 
trusts a score from zero to three stars 
based on performance against three sets 
of data, of which waiting times targets 
comprised a central element. Failure to 
achieve such targets was coupled to high-
stakes sanctions: in the first year, the 12 
hospitals that were zero-rated were publicly 
‘named and shamed’ and six of their chief 
executives were sacked. So while Wales 
maintained a hospital governance structure 
based on trust and altruism, England 
shifted from T&A to TPR.
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What was the effect of this natural 
experiment? How did waiting times change 
in England, relative to Wales, following the 
divergence in governance policy?  
Our econometric study compared 
English and Welsh hospitals’ waiting 
time performance for elective day case 
or ordinary admission. Waiting times in 
English hospitals fell, relative to Wales, 
following the introduction of TPR. NHS 
trusts in England responded to the specific 
targets by ‘tail gunning’: each year focusing 
on eliminating the long waits that put them 
at risk of missing the targets for that and 
the following year, at the expense of those 
waiting much shorter times. 
The consistent finding from these two 
natural experiments, therefore, is that the 
T&A model resulted in worse reported 
performance in Wales as compared to 
England on what were each government’s 
key objectives of improving examination 
performance at age 16 and reducing 
long hospital waiting times. This is strong 
evidence given the closeness of the 
systems prior to these changes in models 
of governance, and the similarities in 
funding and organization before and after 
those changes. 
Can we say anything about the 
mechanism(s) by which TPR – league tables 
and star ratings – had its positive effect? 
Our assessment is that the key driver for 
improved performance in both cases came 
from the reputation effects of ‘naming 
and shaming’ in the TPR model. While the 
education discourse focuses on choice 
and competition, there is in reality little 
potential for parental choice in largely rural 
Wales, suggesting limited scope for this 
model to drive performance improvements. 
In health, the high-stakes target regime 
seems to have been less prominent after 
the second year; in subsequent years there 
seems to have been a shift of emphasis to 
the reputation effects of the TPR model. 
Our conclusion from these two natural 
experiments, therefore, is that ‘naming 
and shaming’ did work in England, as 
compared with Wales, resulting in improved 
examination performance and eliminating 
the endemic problem of long hospital 
waiting times.
Gwyn Bevan is Professor of Policy 
Analysis at the LSE and Deborah 
Wilson is Reader in Public Policy at the 
University of Bristol, UK
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The UK has been at the forefront of the 
‘audit explosion’, but its passion for 
performance management has received 
mixed reviews.  Some commentators 
believe it has blazed a trail for other 
countries to follow. Others argue that 
imposing top down targets and external 
assessments on public services has 
proved costly, distorted behaviour and 
not focussed on outcomes. A third school 
of thought suggests that a tough regime 
is needed to get public services from 
‘awful to adequate’, before bringing a 
more sophisticated combination of policy 
instruments into play to drive further 
improvement. These debates have often, 
however, been rather abstract. There has 
been surprisingly little effort to test them 
empirically by analysing and learning 
from the contrasting approaches to 
performance assessment which have been 
seen within the UK over recent years. 
Variations and Outcomes
There have been marked variations in 
approaches to corporate performance 
assessment in local government between 
different parts of the UK. Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment (CPA) in England 
was based on the premise that councils 
needed a powerful external prompt in 
order to identify and address weaknesses. 
It therefore provided annual assessments 
based on a standard scoring system which 
enabled the Audit Commission to ‘name 
and shame’ poor performers. The Scottish 
Government and Audit Scotland pursued 
a more consensual approach. Best Value 
Audits (BVAs) were attuned to local  
Natural Laboratory:  
Learning from a comparison of 
Performance Regimes in the UK
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context and priorities; councils were only 
assessed once every three years; and there 
were no overall performance score. 
As a result, it was not easy for ministers 
and voters to make explicit comparisons 
between local authorities. Policy makers 
in Wales argued that improvement 
could not be forced from the centre; it 
had to come from within councils. The 
Wales Programme for Improvement 
(WPI) was tailored to local priorities and 
each authority’s particular improvement 
journey. Local authorities undertook self-
assessments and agreed improvement 
and regulatory plans with the Audit 
Commission. 
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The local government performance 
frameworks in the UK have not stood 
still for very long. CPA was revised within 
three years to provide a ‘harder test’ and 
in 2008 it was abandoned altogether in 
favour of the broader Comprehensive 
Area Assessment (CAA). This aimed to 
deliver a fundamental change in approach 
whereby inspectorates reached joint 
judgements about the ways in which 
services (local government, health, police 
and fire services) were working together. In 
2010, the Coalition Government ordered 
an immediate end to all work on CAA and 
the abolition of the Audit Commission. 
CAA has been replaced by a voluntary 
programme of corporate peer challenges 
orchestrated by the Local Government 
Association.
In Scotland, the BVA methodology was 
overhauled in 2009. Like CAA, the second 
round of BVAs placed much greater 
emphasis on joint working between 
local government and other local service 
providers. Auditors now evaluated both the 
implementation of the duty of best value 
by local authorities and the achievement 
by Community Planning Partnerships of 
the targets set out in their Single Outcome 
Agreements. A methodology for auditing 
Community Planning Partnerships 
piloted in 2012 suggests that BVAs are 
likely to revert to their original focus on 
local authorities alone and will only be 
conducted in future by exception when 
risk assessments highlight potential 
performance problems or capacity issues. 
In Wales, new guidance issued in 2005 
introduced greater flexibility concerning 
the nature and timing of risk assessments 
and reduced the number of statutory 
performance indicators. The 2009 
Local Government Measure signalled 
more fundamental changes that linked 
performance assessment explicitly to 
community strategies and required 
councils to publish performance data. 
The Wales Audit Office now publishes 
annual analyses of whether an authority 
has achieved planned improvements and 
an assessment of its capacity to achieve 
future improvement. Interestingly, just as 
policy makers in Wales were embracing this 
more muscular approach to performance 
assessment, the Coalition government 
in London was busily dismantling the 
performance framework.
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Learning from Difference
So what can be learned from these 
contrasting and changing approaches to 
performance assessment which the UK 
has witnessed over the last decade? We 
highlight four issues for further analysis  
and debate.
First, there should be more systematic 
comparative analysis within the UK. 
England, Scotland and Wales provide a 
natural experiment that enables different 
approaches to addressing shared service 
delivery problems to be analysed. 
There are though practical problems in 
conducting rigorous comparative analysis 
because each country has developed their 
own unique national sets of measures. 
Second, partly because of the problems 
of comparative performance data, 
researchers and policy makers should 
consider what other evidence might be 
used to assess the performance of local 
government (and other public services). 
England, Scotland and Wales have all 
invested heavily in the development of 
inter-authority benchmarking in recent 
years but they rely on a narrow band of 
metrics derived from administrative data 
and statutory performance indicators. 
As a result, whilst they provide evidence 
about internal processes and individual 
services, they have little to say about 
broader outcomes. In our view, there is a 
need for a ‘whole systems’ approach that 
links up all of the different elements of a 
performance framework including self-
assessments, peer challenge, statutory 
reporting, external inspections and ‘softer’ 
intelligence such as feedback from staff. 
Third, there are important questions 
about the role citizens play in assessing 
performance.  Notionally, most 
assessments are undertaken in some 
sense on behalf of the public (or ‘in the 
public interest’), but in practice, members 
of the public are usually peripheral to the 
assessment process. There have been a 
number of attempts to make performance 
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data available in more ‘user-friendly’ 
formats such as star ratings, but citizens 
have shown much less interest in these 
data than policy makers hoped. Public 
services need to become better at tailoring 
performance data for different audiences 
and potentially involve the public in 
designing measures that they consider 
important and meaningful. 
Finally, we still lack a proper understanding 
of the impact of performance assessment 
on public services. As a result, potentially 
far reaching policy decisions, such as the 
scrapping of CAA and Audit Commission 
in England, appear to be based on political 
instinct, rather than rigorous analysis of 
the likely effects and possible unintended 
consequences. 
To fill this gap in knowledge there is a 
need for more ‘real time’ research about 
how different approaches to performance 
assessment operate in practice. Research 
could also explore how the role of 
assessment changes in an era of austerity 
and what can be learnt from international 
experiences? 
It is also important to find out more about 
the limits to performance assessment - 
what can it achieve and what is beyond 
its reach - and how policy makers should 
respond if self-assessment, external 
inspection, peer support and government 
intervention all fail to produce performance 
improvement.
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Scottish Local government continues to 
face the same financial, demographic and 
demand pressures as other parts of the 
UK public sector, while simultaneously 
continuing to seek service improvements in 
pursuit of better outcomes for customers 
and citizens.  A key response by Scottish 
local government to these challenges 
has been the development of a single 
benchmarking approach for all 32 councils. 
The Local Government  
Benchmarking Framework
In part to help meet statutory performance 
management and accountability duties, 
as set out in the Local Government in 
Scotland (2003) Act, and to help manage 
the consequences of financial retrenchment 
while simultaneously improving services 
via self evaluation, the Improvement 
Service (IS) and the Scottish branch of the 
Society of Local Authority Chief Executives 
(SOLACE) launched a benchmarking project 
for Scottish Councils in late 2010. The 
project team engaged with the Accounts 
Commission for Scotland early on in the 
project to ensure they were aware of the 
project. The Commission offered support 
and encouragement and were routinely 
briefed throughout its development. 
It was recognised that while many 
individual services participated in 
benchmarking clubs there was no single, 
corporate arrangement that involved all 
32 councils simultaneously. Therefore the 
core purpose of the exercise was to use a 
collective commitment to self evaluation 
Benchmarking and Service 
Improvement in Scottish  
Local Government  
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and improvement to develop a corporate 
led benchmarking framework, highlighting 
service costs, performance and related 
outcome measures. The first step was 
to agree relevant indicators which were 
developed throughout 2011 covering all 
major council services. 
The key criterion that was applied to each 
indicator was that it had to be able to be 
collected on a comparable basis across all 
32 Scottish councils. The following detailed 
sub criteria were applied to each indicator 
before final inclusion in the suite. 
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Each indicator had to be:  
1. Relevant to what council services 
delivered to customers and citizens;
2. Unambiguous and clearly understood;
3. Underpinned by timely data;
4. Accessible with clear guidelines on 
their application;
5. Statistically and methodologically 
robust;
6. Consistently applied across services 
and all councils;
7. Cost effective to collect.
In total, some 55 indicators and supporting 
data were developed to generate a 
balanced picture of service performance. 
The key source of the data for the cost 
indicators was the Local Financial Return 
(LFR). The LFR is the best source of reliable 
and comparable data on costs for all 32 
councils in Scotland. While LFR returns 
made to Scottish Government by councils 
provides aggregate cost information for all 
service areas it did not provide sufficient 
detail in accounting for Central (Corporate) 
Support Costs. The IS, working with 
Directors of Finance, developed guidance 
to help councils generate this data to more 
fully account for this cost.
The other data sources that were used 
to populate the indicators were drawn 
from Statutory Performance Indicators 
(SPI’s); service performance and statistical 
returns to the Scottish Government and 
the Scottish Household Survey to measure 
customer satisfaction. Overall the intention 
was to create a set of indicators to allow 
benchmarking on the basis of ‘rounded 
judgements’ of service performance. 
The indicators were purposely designed 
as ‘can openers’ to highlight where council 
performance differed and to support 
exchanges to understand the basis of the 
difference while exchanging good practice 
from well performing services. This requires 
an understanding of local service contexts 
and how factors within those contexts 
affect services e.g. local population socio 
economics and demographics. 
The project also had to contend with the 
complexity that the data has to be read 
in the round in order to establish cost to 
outcome/ performance ratios (for example 
education services costs combined with 
educational attainment outcomes). Simply 
focusing on spend data alone misses a key 
point, which is, the relationship between 
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spending levels and outcomes achieved 
and understanding matters such as does 
low or high spend equate to better service 
outcomes? 
To support the interrogation of the data 
and to identify and share good service 
practice the project built supporting drill 
down processes to promote dialogue 
between councils on where good practice 
lies and to share it across councils. In so 
doing the intention is to better understand 
factors that each council can control to 
improve its costs against its performance 
achievements. The raw data on its own 
does not identify how to improve a service 
but gives councils the context within which 
they can explore and better understand 
issues and a platform through which they 
can learn from established good practice. 
Lastly it was agreed that the benchmarking 
data, the supporting analysis and 
subsequent council improvement actions 
would be fully reported to local citizens. 
A single national analytical ‘report’ was 
prepared by the IS covering the following: 
• what the indicators explain about 
council services and what they do not;
• what changes in service performance 
occur over time; 
• explain why variation occurs in 
council performance and what within 
that variation is a matter of local 
policy choice as opposed to service 
weakness or failures;
• presenting the benchmarking results 
in standardised forms for all services 
and councils.
Each council will publish their local 
Public Performance Reports and the full 
data and the overview report can be 
viewed at: www.improvementservice.
org.uk/benchmarking which also links 
to all council’s web sites were local 
developments are set out. 
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Next Steps
In December 2012 the Accounts 
Commission altered its direction on the use 
of SPIs to effectively to require councils to 
substitute their use with the benchmarking 
framework. This was welcomed by local 
government, as it saw the need for public 
accountability to be driven by data that was 
core to and based on service improvement 
requirements. Local government has 
committed to further strengthening 
the framework and a project board has 
been established comprising of COSLA, 
SOLACE, the IS and the major local 
government professional associations with 
an independent chair and representation 
from Audit Scotland on an advisory basis. 
The board is to oversee a development 
plan to continually improve the framework 
and the IS continues to resource the next 
development phase supported by groups 
of local government officers. 
 
Conclusions
Overall the Scottish experience 
demonstrates that a corporate led 
approach to benchmarking can add 
value to local government improvement 
processes. To succeed takes strong and 
consistent leadership from within local 
government plus the support of bodies 
such as the IS. To help drive improvement, 
councils need to start with consistent 
‘can opening’ data that captures the key 
dimensions of service performance in 
the round. Importantly councils need to 
‘get behind’ the data to understand why 
services achieve differential results and 
to identify where effective practice lies 
in achieving high quality service delivery. 
The development of a benchmarking 
framework must be iterative and involve 
councils and other relevant stakeholders 
to develop and agree indicators and the 
supporting benchmarking processes. 
Having achieved the development of a 
suitable benchmarking framework Scottish 
Councils are now embarking upon the next 
step in their improvement journey.
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Since the Local Government Association’s 
(LGA’s) successful campaign to reduce the 
burden of central government inspection 
and assessment of authorities, we have 
been working with councils to develop an 
approach to improvement which is based 
on the sector’s learning about and sharing 
what works best. The core principles of this 
approach to sector-led improvement are 
that:
• authorities are responsible for 
driving their own improvement and 
monitoring their own performance 
(through transparent data, self-
assessment and peer challenge); 
• they are accountable locally (not 
to central government or the 
inspectorates);
• there is a sense of collective 
responsibility for each other.
The LGA’s role is to help authorities take 
advantage of this approach, and Local 
Government Inform (LG Inform) is the LGA’s 
benchmarking data service for councils 
and fire and rescue authorities, and one 
element of the LGA’s support. A new 
version of LG Inform has been released this 
month, with improved performance and 
functionality.
LG Inform brings together a range of key 
performance data for authorities, alongside 
contextual and financial information, in 
an online tool – http://www.local.gov.uk/
about-lginform. Users can view the data, 
make comparisons between their authority 
and other councils or groups of councils, 
or construct their own reports bringing 
several data items together. Importantly, 
the data is updated quickly after being 
published at its source. 
Benchmarking Data for 
Improvement: Local Government 
and LG Inform
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The aims of LG Inform are four-fold. First, 
it is to bring together into one place, 
from a range of sources, a selection of 
key information about an area. There are 
nearly 1,000 pieces of data about an area 
within LG Inform, which includes traditional 
‘performance’ data alongside financial 
and contextual data. Previously, the data 
was available across a number of central 
government and other websites, with no 
easy means to view it together.
Secondly, it is to make such information 
available not only to performance officers 
within councils, but to the senior staff 
who run the services, the councillors 
37
with responsibility for them, and the 
councillors scrutinising them. LG Inform is 
an aid to internal self-assessment, to help 
users compare, contrast and challenge 
the performance of their authority 
intelligently, and thereby manage and 
improve performance. Much of the data 
within it features in local authorities’ own 
performance plans, and is being used 
locally to drive improvements. In order to 
deliver this, a key element of LG Inform is 
accessibility: by default a user views the 
data for their own authority in a series of 
pre-written reports (although they can  
view other authorities’ data if they choose), 
and they can build reports that reflect 
the priorities of their council or their  
own interests. 
The third aim is to allow local government 
to collect its own data. LG Inform has now 
begun to offer this service: whereas in the 
past local authorities paid to be members 
of benchmarking clubs, the aim is to 
provide a free service to authorities for key 
sets of benchmarking data. Although this 
exercise sounds simple, in some ways it is 
the most challenging element of making LG 
Inform successful.
Councils have identified a need to collect 
three sorts of data:
• provisional data – providing early sight 
of data which has been submitted to 
central government, but which often 
takes many months to be published
• in-year data – for data which can 
change throughout the year, collecting 
it at key points so authorities can check 
progress before year-end
• new data – collecting data which is 
useful to authorities but not collected 
centrally, and so providing the 
opportunity for councils to benchmark.
It is this collection element that is subject 
to most scrutiny, because it entails the 
development of data standards which 
councils must uphold (to ensure authorities 
are collecting, measuring and reporting 
data in the same way) and will involve  
some checking and testing of the data 
by the LGA. Benchmarking purists would 
argue that both the data standards and 
quality assurance need to be done to a  
very high standard, for comparisons to  
be meaningful. 
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We do not disagree. However, we are also 
aware that there is value for the sector in 
‘fit for purpose’, timely data and we are 
striving to balance the two. We are mindful 
that the value to councils is getting sight 
of others’ data early enough to be able to 
see how their own performance compares, 
and consider whether they need to take 
action in light of that. But confidence in 
the accuracy of the data is also important 
and to this end we will be doing systematic 
but limited checking of the data before 
publishing it to authorities as soon as 
possible.
In particular, for the new data, the LGA 
needs to work with the sector to develop 
suitable definitions and standards. We have 
already consulted on a series of questions 
for councils to use in residents’ satisfaction 
surveys, and the guidance on where to 
place them in the questionnaire; and we 
are currently collecting this data from 
authorities who have used these questions 
and guidance. Although some councils 
have been disappointed by the definitions 
and standards we applied, because they 
do not match what they are currently 
collecting, we hope that, if they are willing 
to compromise and use them in future, the 
benefits of being able to compare their 
performance with others will outweigh that. 
Although this element of the LG Inform 
programme sounds involved and 
challenging, the prize for local government 
is the ability to identify and collect our own 
data which is meaningful and useful locally, 
which can be reported more quickly and 
which can strengthen local accountability. 
We will be collecting data for our purposes 
– not for upward reporting to government. 
The fourth and final aim of LG Inform is 
to assist councils with their transparency 
and accountability. LG Inform will be 
made available to the public at the end of 
autumn. Councils will either be able to add 
a link to LG Inform from their websites or, 
if they choose to, embed reports or charts 
from LG Inform into their web pages. This 
will also enable them to add contextual 
information that might be needed to 
explain performance in certain areas; and 
in this way authorities will be imparting 
knowledge and explanation to their 
residents, not just data.
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LG Inform strives to deliver many things to 
a number of audiences. The online tool is 
not an end in itself. Equally as important 
is the data contained within it, and its 
ability to allow local government to start 
thinking about its own data needs, rather 
than simply responding to requests for 
data from central government. It also offers 
authorities a way to share their data with 
residents in a meaningful way, as the basis 
for local accountability. We feel it is a major 
step forward in local self-improvement, in 
transparency, and in accountability.
Michael Coughlin is Executive Director, 
and Juliet Whitworth is Research and 
Information Manager at the Local 
Government Association, UK. 
LG Inform is available to users with a 
council or fire and rescue authority email 
address at www.local.gov.uk/lginform. 
For those outside of local government, 
LG Inform will be public from the end of 
November 2013.
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Local government in Wales faces the 
same financial, demographic and demand 
pressures as other parts of the UK public 
sector. Despite such constraints there is 
a need for councils to continue to deliver 
improved outcomes for their citizens. It has 
therefore never been more important for 
local councils, individually and collectively, to 
understand and compare their performance 
by making better use of performance 
information to plan service improvements. 
The Performance Improvement Framework 
Welsh councils have a long history of 
collecting, reporting and using performance 
data. A revised performance improvement 
framework for local government in Wales  
was introduced in April 2011. This is shown in  
Fig. 1 opposite. 
Performance management and 
benchmarking - The Wales 
experience
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Figure 1: The Performance Improvement Framework for local government in Wales
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While the framework is still relatively 
new, significant changes in both activity 
and culture are already emerging. Public 
reporting of performance data, national 
and local, is well established in Wales 
and plays a valuable role in informing the 
citizen and holding local government to 
account. While benchmarking is not new to 
councils in Wales, the new framework has 
provided local government services with 
the opportunity to adopt benchmarking 
more formally as part of their service 
improvement activity.
Under the previous framework, performance 
management and public accountability was 
often seen as the role of councils’ corporate 
‘performance teams’. While the service 
areas provided performance data to the 
centre, the extent to which it was valued and 
used by the service itself varied and was 
often limited. The culture is now changing. 
The new framework places the ownership 
for benchmarking (service improvement) 
data firmly with the services themselves.
To be effective, data used for benchmarking 
should be drawn from operational data 
which is valued by services themselves. This 
now happens in Wales. It is the service areas 
who decide what data it is helpful to collate 
and share, usually from the starting point of 
what evidence do they need to effectively 
manage and deliver their service. They do 
not do this in isolation. For example they will 
involve regulatory bodies where appropriate 
and take into account any nationally agreed 
priorities or national frameworks. The 
service areas also coordinate any national 
benchmarking activity. Wales benefits from 
being a small country in this respect. It is 
possible to get service representatives 
from all 22 councils in one room on a 
relatively regular basis to discuss the data; 
the messages coming from it; and how this 
might be used to support improvement. 
In addition to the culture change around 
ownership of the benchmarking data, there 
has been a shift in how it is being used. Even 
for those service areas which have been 
benchmarking their performance for many 
years, there has been a noticeable change 
of emphasis. It is now much more about the 
‘so what’? There is an increased focus on the 
use of value added analysis - transforming 
the data into information and intelligence 
which can then be used to support change 
and improvement. 
Another feature of the new framework 
is the concept of benchmarking data 
quality being ‘good enough’.  There 
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remains a strong focus on data quality, 
particularly for the nationally published 
performance indicators. However, it is 
recognised that spending too much effort 
on improving data accuracy is not always 
an efficient use of resource. Indicators 
are, as their name suggests, indicators. 
As such they are something with which 
to open the discussion about relative 
performance. Resource is better directed 
to understanding the differences in 
performance and sharing effective practice 
to drive improvement.  
It is still relatively early days in terms of the 
new framework and many of the service 
areas are still on the early part of their 
benchmarking journey. Several service 
areas are currently at the stage of reviewing 
their respective benchmarking datasets. 
Other service areas, where datasets have 
been long established, are focusing on 
developing meaningful analysis in order to 
help them identify those who are ‘bucking 
the trend’. Subsequent dialogue can 
unearth the learning and support shared 
service improvement.
The new approach not only makes the 
datasets more meaningful and useful, but 
encourages ownership. Engagement with 
this new approach is notable, with service 
professionals seeing real value from the 
benchmarking work. 
Painting a full picture of performance
In addition to performance data, local 
authorities use a range of contextual 
information to assist them in understanding 
the needs of service users and in planning, 
delivering and improving services. This 
includes data such as that available from 
the Census and other national and local 
data sets. Authorities also collect a range 
of quantitative and qualitative data from 
service users and citizens. 
Across Welsh local government there is a 
continued focus on citizen engagement, 
both in the planning and prioritising of 
services as well as monitoring outcomes. For 
example, many councils have been actively 
seeking the views of their citizens as part 
of their prioritisation and service reviews in 
response to the difficult budget position. 
Councils and Local Service Boards have 
also been undertaking citizen surveys to 
understand the needs and views of citizens 
to inform their single integrated plans. 
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Local government recognises the 
need to focus on improving outcomes 
and has sought to develop measures 
to assist in doing this. As changes in 
population outcomes often require 
a multi-agency approach, this is not 
always straightforward, so measuring the 
contribution of individual organisations 
can be difficult. Where this is the case they 
have sought to use proxy indicators to 
measure and monitor local government’s 
contribution. The single integrated plans 
being taken forward by Local Service 
Boards across Wales are providing an 
opportunity for a stronger focus on 
outcomes and multi-agency delivery.
So what?
National performance data shows that local 
government in Wales continues to deliver 
for the citizens it serves. While not all Welsh 
authorities have maintained the levels of 
performance across all services that citizens 
might expect, generally the picture is of 
one of local government delivering for the 
people of Wales. Against a backdrop of 
increased service pressures and difficult 
financial constraints, data shows that local 
government has not only maintained levels 
of performance, but delivered sustained 
improvement.
A summary of the improvement in the 
performance of Welsh councils in the three 
years to April 2013 is shown below.
As shown in the chart, not only has overall 
local government performance in Wales 
shown sustained improvement, but the  
gap between the best and worst  
performing councils continues to narrow. 
Given the continued financial and service 
pressures, it paints a positive picture of 
Welsh local government’s commitment 
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to continuous improvement. It is difficult 
to quantify the contribution that the 
performance improvement framework and
benchmarking activities have made to 
the continued improvement in councils’ 
performance. However, evidence, including 
the increased value which councils place 
on performance information, suggests they 
have and continue to play an important role 
in supporting informed decision making 
and delivering service improvement.
Andrew Stephens is the Director of the 
Local Government Data Unit Wales.
Figure 1: Overall Welsh local 
authority performance (year on 
year comparison)
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The way performance of local authorities 
is measured and compared varies widely 
in the OECD (Kuhlmann, 2004; Kuhlmann, 
2010). We refer to ‘benchmarking’ if the 
objective is to identify best practices 
in order to draw lessons for one’s own 
organization (‘learning from the best’); 
this may also include explaining any 
performance gaps. If we could answer 
Hood’s (2007) question ‘why does it vary’ 
we might understand and therefore 
minimize numerous, often perverse effects 
associated with benchmarking exercises. 
Therefore we do compare benchmarking 
exercises at the local level of government 
in Sweden, England, Switzerland, and 
Germany to discover whether there are 
significant country differences or similarities 
in the governance structure, the extent of 
coverage and the utilization of the results. 
We conclude that benchmarking in local 
government has to be put into context—its 
institutional and political starting conditions 
need to be understood, especially 
the peculiarities underlying the local 
administrative structures.
Analytical dimensions and types of local 
government benchmarking
The Governance structure of a 
benchmarking exercise may take three 
distinct forms, the first being voluntary 
local self-management - several local 
authorities take the initiative, without 
intervention from the state, to measure 
and compare their performance against 
those of their peers. At the other extreme 
is an organizational system of compulsory 
hierarchical management. 
Why does performance 
benchmarking vary? Evidence  
from European local government
solace.org.uk
Sabine Kuhlmann and Tim Jäkel
In this case, the design of the performance 
indicators, the inspection process, and the 
information exchange take place under the 
supervision of central or state government. 
Yet, actors from central or state government 
and local government may co-operate to 
develop performance indicators, gather 
data, and report on and analyse the results; 
this can be described as vertically co-
ordinated management.
With regard to the extent of coverage, 
compulsory hierarchical benchmarking is 
likely to cover a whole country. The use of 
voluntary types of benchmarking, on the 
other hand, depends on the willingness 
of local authorities and will therefore be 
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less widely used, at least under certain 
conditions. There are also varying degrees 
of transparency in benchmarking systems. 
For instance, compulsory hierarchical 
benchmarking often relies on the incentive 
mechanism of ‘naming and shaming’—good 
performers earn public acclaim, while those 
revealed to be poor performers face the 
risk of public denunciation (Pawson, 2002). 
Finally, benchmarking may be linked to 
formal and/or informal sanctions. Formal 
sanctions may involve positive or negative 
financial incentives, depending on whether 
a specific level of performance is achieved 
or not. Informal sanctions are based on the 
principle of public access to trigger the 
‘naming and shaming’ incentive mechanism. 
Mapping local level benchmarking in 
Western Europe: empirical evidence 
from Sweden, England, Switzerland, and 
Germany.
First of all, a high degree of functional 
decentralization seems to be necessary 
for the evolution and maintenance of 
benchmarking in local government. 
Moreover, there are several forms of 
benchmarking exercises in each the four 
countries. Yet, in every country a specific 
approach turns out to be most prevalent: 
England is characterized by a top- down 
model of benchmarking, while the voluntary 
self-management approach is the dominant 
form in Germany and Switzerland. Sweden 
has to be placed in between the vertically 
co-ordinated and the self-managed types.
The top-down imposed comprehensive 
benchmarking system is seen only in 
England, which is also the only country with 
a unitary-centralized state structure. 
As may be expected from the general 
relationship between the central and 
local levels in England, benchmarking 
here follows the principles of a ‘muscular 
centralism’ (Martin et al., 2010, p. 36), 
resulting in a process that is neither 
entrusted to the voluntary self-
management of local authorities nor 
carried out in a co-operative spirit. In 
addition, the operational principles of NPM 
and benchmarking tend to be relatively 
easily channeled into the administrative 
reform policies within the Anglo-Saxon 
administrative culture. In contrast, the 
multi-level power-sharing in Sweden, as 
well as the federal structures in Switzerland 
and Germany, do not support nationwide 
mandatory benchmarking approaches.
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Although based on a unitary state structure, 
the configuration of the administrative and 
local government system is quite different 
in the Swedish case, as is the nature of 
the benchmarking exercises. The ongoing 
spread of locally self-managed, but also 
vertically co-ordinated, benchmarking 
exercises is based on the major role of 
municipalities in the provision of public 
services and in upholding the Swedish 
welfare state. This is mirrored by the high 
proportion of local government staff 
(83% of overall public employment), the 
fiscal strength (local income tax) and the 
large- scale territorial structure of local 
governments that contains benchmarking 
transaction costs. 
Furthermore, the ‘strong tradition of 
consensual, corporatist style of decision-
making’ (Goldsmith and Larsen, 2004, p. 
213) in the inter-governmental setting and 
the deeply rooted culture of transparency 
and evaluation in Swedish public 
administration ensures that being a part of 
benchmarking project is not considered as 
a threat but as a chance for improvement.
Even though German and Swiss local 
governments are considered to be 
politically and functionally strong, 
benchmarking as a tool of administrative 
modernization has still not developed 
country-wide. This is surprising, especially 
for Switzerland, given the high level 
of political, functional, and financial 
decentralization, as well as its strong 
tradition of direct and consensual 
local democracy. An explanation is the 
fragmented territorial structure of the Swiss 
municipal system. In addition, the principles 
of freedom of information and transparency 
are generally less firmly entrenched within 
the administrative cultures of continental 
European nations. Also, the already 
existing ‘real’ tax competition at the local 
level of government in Switzerland might 
establish even more effective incentives 
to cost-efficiency and high-quality service 
delivery than NPM- inspired benchmarking 
measures, which are at most a form of 
‘quasi-competitions’.
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In Germany, too, the large number of small 
municipal units, in which performance 
comparisons may not constitute a 
satisfactory reform instrument, provides an 
explanation for the hesitant establishment 
of benchmarking projects. In addition, a 
strong tradition of party competition in local 
politics especially in the large German cities 
tends to hinder the long-term maintenance 
of voluntary benchmarking projects. 
Finally, the low level of German 
municipalities’ fiscal autonomy is an 
obstacle to a heavy use of benchmarking. 
As a large part of local governments’ 
revenue comes from tax-sharing 
arrangements, incentives to use 
benchmarking as a tool to enhance cost-
efficiency are low: 
• There is no clear line of accountability 
between revenues and spending.
• Tax competition among municipalities 
in Germany is largely absent.
Outlook
Our comparative analysis has revealed 
that the governance structure, extent of 
coverage and impact of benchmarking 
exercises in European countries largely 
(although not solely) depend on the 
institutional properties of the respective 
administrative and local government 
systems (‘starting conditions’). Stricter debt 
ceiling regulations and reform pressures 
resulting from the fiscal crisis in Europe 
could be expected to further intensify the 
demands for enhanced transparency in 
matters of costs and services. Benchmarking 
could emerge as a welcome instrument of 
budget consolidation for state authorities 
and compulsory large-scale benchmarking 
projects may no longer feature as the 
exception but rather the rule. 
In Germany, there are clear indications 
for such a shift, especially in those states 
where the local governments are most 
affected by the current fiscal crisis. Political 
decision-makers in these areas need to 
address the challenge that performance 
indicators of costs and efficiency tend 
to be over-emphasized in statutory 
performance assessments at the expense 
of such issues as quality and effectiveness 
of service delivery. In England, by contrast, 
an exclusively voluntary approach may 
generate exchanges of knowledge that lead 
to learning and to the prevention of gaming 
strategies. However, voluntary approaches 
tend to have in high participant dropout 
rates. In light of all the above, it would be a 
much better option to develop a collegiate, 
decentralized and co-ordinated form of 
benchmarking.
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Performance management has permeated 
public sector organizations worldwide 
over the last decades. At its core is the 
idea of using such information for decision 
making in a systematic form. Externally, 
performance information can be used to 
showcase performance, to give account, or 
to compare and benchmark. Internally, it can 
be used to monitor internal developments 
or to improve operations. 
Is performance information  
actually used?
A link between performance measurement 
and the use of this information in decision 
making is often assumed. Yet, until 
recently, the actual use of performance 
information was not very high on the public 
management research agenda. It is now 
a common observation that governments 
have invested substantially in collecting 
data, yet know relatively little about what 
drives performance information use. We 
present data from a large international 
survey of 3,134 public sector top-executives 
in six countries to analyse determinants 
of performance information use. More 
specifically, we distinguish between two 
major types of use – internal and external 
and search for explanations for the variation 
in use across top public sector executives in 
the six countries. 
Internal and external use of  
performance information
Performance information can be used 
to learn about what is working and what 
isn’t, to improve processes and activities, 
to evaluate how the organisation is 
performing or to celebrate successes. It 
can also be used externally; then it is used 
to promote the work of the organisation 
and to show outsiders what a good job 
the organisation is doing and thus build 
What determines whether top 
public sector executives actually 
use performance information? 
solace.org.uk
Gerhard Hammerschmid, Steven Van de Walle, and Vid Štimac
or maintain an organization’s image 
and legitimacy. In a public sector that 
has become increasingly dominated by 
rankings, and various versions of ‘naming 
and shaming’, performance indicators have 
become important tools for politicking and 
for communicating. 
What determines performance 
information use? A survey of senior 
public sector exectives in 6 countries
The COCOPS Top Public Executives Survey 
was organised mid-2012 as part of the EU 
Seventh Framework Programme research 
project Coordinating for Cohesion in the 
Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS – 
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see www.cocops.eu). The survey targeted all high-level administrative executives at central government ministry and agency level. This article is based on data 
from the first six countries where the survey was finished in summer 2012 (Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Norway). We received answers from 3,134 
respondents and the overall response rate of 26.2% is rather satisfying for this type of survey design, and the high-level position of the respondents.
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TABLE 1 
  
Question: In my work I use performance indicators to…
1 "Not at 
all" 
2 3 4 5 6
7 "To 
a large 
extent"
Obs. Mean
Assess whether I reach my targets 8.7% 8.8% 9.5% 14.7% 21.6% 20.7% 15.9% 2874 4.57
Monitor the performance of my subordinates 8.7% 9.0% 12.0% 18.1% 22.0% 19.5% 10.7% 2867 4.37
Identify problems that need attention 7.7% 7.6% 10.0% 14.2% 22.2% 23.3% 15.1% 2858 4.66
Foster learning and improvement 8.9% 8.7% 12.1% 18.3% 22.8% 18.5% 10.6% 2858 4.36
Satisfy requirements of my superiors 8.9% 9.6% 11.3% 17.6% 21.3% 19.7% 11.6% 2842 4.38
Communicate what my organization does for citizens & service users 17.4% 15.4% 14.5% 16.1% 16.5% 12.9% 7.2% 2853 3.67
Engage with external stake-holders (e.g. interest groups) 21.8% 16.6% 15.4% 16.0% 14.6% 10.5% 5.1% 2834 3.37
Manage the image of my organization 13.8% 11.8% 12.3% 16.6% 21.2% 16.6% 7.7% 2846 4
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 Internal and external use of performance 
indicators was operationalized using eight 
questions. Table 1 reveals that managers 
mainly use performance indicators to 
assess whether they have reached their 
targets and to identify problems that need 
attention. On the other hand, managers are 
less likely to use performance indicators to 
engage with external stakeholders, or to 
communicate what the organisation does 
to citizens and service users. 
Overall, roughly 30% of the executives 
surveyed seem to use performance 
information to a larger degree (6 and 7 on 
the Likert scale) whereas about 15% do not 
use performance information at all or to a 
very limited degree (scalepoints 1 and 2).
The extent of internal and external use 
of performance information differs 
considerably across countries. Self-
reported performance information use 
is significantly and consistently lower in 
Germany and France, while it is higher in 
Italy and Estonia. This is especially the case 
for external use. 
We continue by explaining differences in 
performance information use, by looking 
at two sets of factors. The first set consists 
of organizational factors, and refers to 
characteristics of the organization in which 
the respondent works. The second set 
consists of individual socio-demographic 
characteristics of the top public executive. 
We find that the type of organization 
has a significant impact on the use of 
performance information. Compared 
with executives in central government 
ministries, executives working in agencies, 
regional ministries, or other sub-national 
bodies report a significantly higher use of 
performance information. Policy fields also 
matter. Internal performance information 
use is higher among respondents working 
in employment services, economic 
affairs and finance. External performance 
information use in contrast is higher 
among those working in justice, public 
order & safety, and (again) employment 
services. The degree of performance 
management instruments implemented in 
the organization has – not surprisingly – the 
strongest effect on the use of performance 
information, while in contrast organization 
size does not matter.
Findings at the individual level show that 
lower hierarchical levels make less use of 
performance indicators. This is especially 
the case for external use. The main 
finding at the individual level is that public 
managers with prior – and especially rather 
long (more than 10 years) – experience in 
the private sector are more active users of 
performance information. 
The most interesting finding is that when 
individual and organizational determinants 
are combined, almost all individual level 
factors turn insignificant. In other words, 
the extent of performance information 
use depends almost exclusively on 
organizational factors, notably the type 
of organization and policy field. The most 
relevant variable influencing the public 
managers´ use of performance information 
however is the degree of implementation 
of performance management instruments – 
and by that the information availability – in 
their organization. 
Gerhard Hammerschmid is Professor 
of Public and Financial Management, 
Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, 
Germany,  Steven Van de Walle is 
Professor of Public Administration, 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands, and Vid Štimac is a 
Research Associate at the Hertie School 
of Governance, Germany.
The research leading to these results 
has received funding from the European 
Unions’ Seventh Framework Programme 
under grant agreement No. 266887 (Project 
COCOPS), Socio-economic Sciences and 
Humanities.
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Persuasion and evidence is explored here in 
three sections: the first presents an historical 
case of public sector benchmarking; the 
second provides a critical reflection on the 
official account of the case; and the third 
gives theoretical observations. 
Building New Schools Efficiently in 
England and Wales in the 1950s
The Ministry of Education was responsible 
for the strategic management of a major 
school building programme in England 
and Wales in the 1950s and the Treasury 
treated the Ministry’s management of the 
programme as a ‘benchmark’. The Treasury 
was impressed by the cost control achieved 
and thought that the lessons could lead to 
‘application in other fields’.  
In 1949 the Ministry had created an 
Architects and Building (A and B) branch 
part of whose role was to diffuse advice 
on school building practice to Local 
Education Authorities (LEAs) which had 
direct responsibility for school building. 
The Treasury saw this innovation as central 
to the success of the programme. In 1949 
ambitious limits on capital cost per school 
place had been introduced but there 
were requirements that minimum levels 
of teaching space be maintained. The 
achievement of cost control was attributed 
to two precepts linked to work of the A and 
B branch: to design schools to reduce the 
overall size of schools by cutting circulation 
space such as corridors; and to make much 
more extensive use of pre-fabrication in 
school building.
Persuasion and Evidence: 
an historical case study of 
public sector benchmarking 
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A Benchmark Revisited
Four principal problems can be identified 
with this account. Firstly, the Treasury 
measured cost control by a comparison of 
the (inflation adjusted) cost per place at the 
beginning and end of the 1950s but such 
comparisons do not reveal the trajectory of 
improvement. The inflation adjusted cost 
per place in primary schools fell 52.8 per 
cent between 1949 and 1960 but a fall of 
51 per cent had already been achieved by 
1954. Over the same period the inflation 
adjusted cost per place fell by 50.9 per cent 
in secondary schools but a 50.1 per cent 
improvement had been achieved by 1954. 
Between 1954 and 1960 there was an 
effective plateau with respect to this cost 
indicator.
49
Secondly, a similar plateau effect can be 
seen in the attempt to redesign schools 
with smaller overall areas. In primary schools 
average overall square foot per place fell 
by 38 per cent between December 1949 
and June 1960 but an average area per 
place slightly below the 1960 level had been 
achieved by December 1953. In the case of 
secondary schools, over the same period, 
average area per place fell 34 per cent 
between 1949 and 1960 but the 1960 level 
had virtually been reached by 1956.
Thirdly, the Treasury’s assumption that 
prefabrication was being increasingly used 
in school building was false. Prefabricated 
schools, defined as schools where both 
frame/load bearing components and 
walling components were made off-site, 
accounted for 20.7 per cent of the value of 
school constructional elements in England 
and Wales in 1950 and 14 per cent in 1960/1. 
Finally, there is a lack of systematic 
evidence on the issue of whether use of 
prefabrication resulted in lower capital 
costs but data in the National Archive (NA) 
compares costs of schools built under 
the Consortia of Local Authorities Special 
Programme (CLASP), a group of LEAs 
which particularly pursued prefabrication, 
with overall national trends in capital costs. 
Data covering the 1957-60 period showed 
no consistent cost advantage for CLASP 
schools. Over this period CLASP primary 
school costs per place fluctuated between 
4 per cent  higher than the national average 
to 3 per cent lower; secondary school costs 
fluctuated  between 3 per cent higher and 5 
per cent lower.
Persuasion and Evidence
The Treasury’s benchmarking narrative was 
flawed. There was a reduction in capital 
costs in schools but this quickly reached 
a plateau as did the scope for reducing 
the overall size of schools. There was no 
evidence in the period that prefabrication 
was becoming more significant and no 
systematic evidence that it was cheaper. 
What was then was the reason for this 
flawed account and are there any general 
lessons from this case? Arguably central 
to benchmarking is a tension between 
evidence and persuasion. Benchmarking 
claims to be founded on evidence of 
superior performance and this is used to 
persuade other organisations to adopt 
the perceived ‘best practice’. These two 
strands raise the potential problem that 
the evidence is used to justify a preferred 
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policy option. For the Treasury the case 
of schools carried the attraction (to a 
department aiming to constrain public 
spending) that public capital programmes 
could be expected to be implemented with 
modest financial allocations, arguably giving 
an incentive to ignore the complexities 
discussed above.
Coming forward fifty years, a similar process 
can be found in contemporary education 
policy. Paul Morris has pointed out that 
the 2010 White Paper The Importance of 
Teaching presents a simplistic account of 
the supposed virtues of increasing school 
autonomy which is in line with the Secretary 
of State for Education’s strong support 
for academies and free schools but not 
consistent with international evidence on 
school performance; users of benchmarking 
should beware hidden (or sometimes not so 
hidden) agendas. 
Tony Cutler is at the Centre for Research 
on Socio-Cultural Change, Manchester 
University.
Treasury views on school building in the 
1950s can be found in evidence to the 
Select Committee on Estimates Eight 
Report School Building, session 1960-1 
and Treasury views on prefabrication in 
NA file T 227/955. Data on cost and areas 
per school place can be found in NA file 
Ed 150/156 and on prefabrication costs in 
file Ed 150/166. Data on the extent of use 
of prefabrication, provided by the then 
Department of Education and Science, was 
published in the University of Liverpool 
Department of Building Science study, 
The primary school: an environment for 
education (1967). Paul Morris’s article ‘Pick 
‘n’ mix, select and project policy borrowing 
and the quest for ‘world class’ schools: an 
analysis of the 2010 Schools White Paper’ 
was published in the Journal of Education 
Policy, 27 (1), 2012, 89-107.
50
Although elections in Britain were long 
held up as a model for the world, concerns 
have been raised about the quality of the 
administration of elections recently. Levels 
of electoral registration have dramatically 
declined. Have local government officials 
been doing everything that they could to 
maximise electoral registration?  There 
have been a number of high profile cases of 
electoral fraud such as those in Birmingham 
in 2004 where the judge reviewing the case 
declared that there were levels of fraud 
that would ‘disgrace a banana republic’. 
Do all local government officials take every 
possible step to secure the integrity of the 
electoral process? 
Questions like these led to a number 
of policy innovations from the Electoral 
Commission and central government to 
improve elections. Amongst these was 
New Labour’s Electoral Administration Act 
2006. This gave the Electoral Commission 
powers to set benchmarking standards for 
Returning Officers, Electoral Registration 
Officers and Referendum Counting Officers 
in Britain. Ten benchmarks for electoral 
registration officers were published 
in July 2008 and seven for returning 
officers in March 2009. For each standard, 
performance indicators were designed to 
measure whether each local authority was 
‘not currently meeting the standard’, was ‘at 
performance standard’ or was ‘above the 
performance standard’. 
This scheme represented uncharted waters 
for British elections. Local government 
officials have long had significant autonomy 
to implement election law. What effect did 
the scheme have?
Benchmarking Standards  
of UK Elections
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Why meet the standards?
I have recently undertaken a research 
project, funded by the Nuffield Foundation 
and McDougall Trust, to discover whether 
performance benchmarking could be 
an effective way of improving elections. 
Election officials who had to meet the 
standards were interviewed and asked why 
they did or did not meet the standards. 
We might expect that the incentives were 
low, given that there were no financial 
penalties for missing the standards. 
Indeed, there were a number of ‘laggards’ 
in adopting the procedures, but after two 
or three annual iterations of the standards 
many local authorities changed practices to 
meet the standards. 
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The reasons for meeting the standards 
were varied. The standards made officials 
aware of new ways of working or gave 
them the confidence to introduce reforms 
that they had heard about elsewhere. 
Sometimes the standards prompted 
either formal or informal reviews of ways of 
working – practices which had otherwise 
been unquestioned for a long period of 
time. Often they were adopted because 
they were associated with professionalism 
– it was ‘the right thing to do’. They also 
provided a template for organising elections 
in periods of change such as authority 
mergers or the appointment of new 
members of staff. 
However, the most commonly found theme 
for why the standards were adopted was 
that individuals or organisations felt that 
they would suffer reputational loss if the 
standards were not met. Middle managers 
commonly implemented standards because 
the reputation of the Chief Executive (who is 
often also the Electoral Registration Officer 
and Returning Officer) was perceived to 
be at stake. However, often the Returning 
Officer took action to ensure that changes 
had been made. One junior official reported 
that she was ‘roasted’ by her Returning 
Officer (who also the Chief Executive of the 
authority) because the authority did not 
meet the standards and this reflected ‘badly 
on her’. Returning Officers frequently knew 
their peers at other authorities very well and 
are part of a closed knit network. The results 
from the standards were made available 
publicly via an online web-tool and they 
would check how they faired against their 
comparators. Where individuals felt that 
their own reputation was not affected by the 
standards, they were less likely to act.  
The effects of the standards
There are some strong reasons to think 
that the standards had very little effect on 
elections. Many officials stated that the 
standards had very little effect on them or 
the electoral services. They often suggested 
that meeting the standards was mostly a 
‘box ticking’ exercise which didn’t affect the 
way that they ran the services. A common 
theme was that meeting the standards 
required them to document existing 
procedures but this did not change how 
they worked. Some authorities even copied 
and pasted plans from officials at other 
authorities and occasionally even forgot 
to change the name of the authority on 
the plan. Some officials admitted marking 
themselves low to begin with to show 
improvement. Others, who were initially 
above the standards, reported that the 
standards encouraged them to drop their 
performance to being at the standard.
However, while many officials reported that 
there was no substantial change, others 
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did. Importantly, these were not always a 
consequence of what the standards were 
but a consequence of the presence of a set 
the standards (see table 1 below).
Table 1: The effects of 
benchmarking
Improved confidence in election 
administration within the council, 
candidates and amongst the public. 
More frequent evaluations of 
services. 
More consistent services were 
produced
Increased contingency plans and risk 
management
Closer and more formal links with 
other stakeholders in the elections 
process.
Increased individual and team morale 
amongst well performing councils
Notably, having externally defined 
standards increased confidence in 
procedures amongst local politicians 
and other elite stakeholders. This is 
significant because other research shows 
how the public, knowing little about 
election administration themselves, take 
cues from politicians about the quality of 
election administration. The presence of 
performance standards can therefore be 
important for improving waning confidence 
in the administration of elections.
Conclusion: reputational matters
Having had the benchmarking scheme in 
place for a number of years, the Electoral 
Commission sought to extend its powers, 
following the 2010 General election, 
arguing that it did not have enough control 
over problematic local authorities. A 
different system was therefore used for 
the referendums of 2011. However, the 
original benchmarking scheme appears to 
have been effective on two counts. First, it 
facilitates learning across peer organisations 
such as councils. Second, it provided the 
Electoral Commission with a powerful ‘stick’ 
for bringing about change. 
Toby S. James is a Lecturer in 
the School of Political, Social and 
International Studies at the University of 
East Anglia, UK.
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Since 1997, the public sector in Canada 
has embarked on a journey towards a 
more citizen-centric service approach. This 
transformation has required the public 
sector to become increasingly responsive 
to the voice of citizens and businesses. As 
a consequence, Canadian jurisdictions at 
the federal, provincial and territorial levels 
began to take a more research-based and 
results-oriented approach to formulating 
their service goals and policies with client 
satisfaction quickly becoming one of their 
key performance indicators. 
Municipal governments were quick to join 
in this process and, in some instances, have 
been well ahead of the curve. Many of them 
have taken a lead in employing effective 
solutions and reaping the full benefits of 
inter-jurisdictional collaboration.
It is all about getting the  
data you can really use
The Institute for Citizen-Centred Service 
(ICCS) was established in 2001 as a cross-
jurisdictional collaborative platform and 
has been actively supporting municipalities 
with solutions designed to offer a better 
understanding of citizen satisfaction 
and service expectations. The Institute 
supports two national councils, the Public 
Sector Service Delivery Council and the 
Public Sector Chief Information Officer 
Council, as well as manages the Certified 
Service Manager (CSM) Program and inter-
governmental research initiatives such as 
Citizens First and Taking Care of Business. 
Municipal governments have been involved 
in the full range of activities organized by 
the Institute and have been among the core 
Listening to the Voice  
of Municipal Citizens:  
A Canadian Perspective 
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sponsors of many of its initiatives (see ICCS 
website to learn more).
  
One ICCS tool that has been particularly 
well received by municipal governments 
is the Common Measurements Tool 
(CMT). The CMT is a program-level client 
satisfaction survey design instrument 
supported by the Institute and used widely 
throughout all three levels of government 
in Canada and in many other jurisdictions 
around the world. The CMT is based on 
common questions and response scales 
which reflect the drivers of client satisfaction 
empirically derived from the Citizens First 
and Taking Care of Business studies and 
allow for effective benchmarking between 
users of the tool. 
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As the ICCS developed a central database 
for storing CMT data to allow users to 
anonymously benchmark their results 
against peer organizations and identify 
best practices, local governments were 
ready to take full advantage of this 
opportunity. Today, nearly half of all data in 
the CMT database comes from municipal 
organizations.
The reason why municipalities have 
embraced the CMT methodology is simple: 
it is an effective tool for collecting client 
satisfaction data and capturing feedback 
on key dimensions of the client service 
experience. It is not only effective but it is 
also easy to use, customizable, and offers a 
great deal of flexibility. CMT users are able 
to incorporate the instrument into their 
organizational performance management 
frameworks in conjunction with other 
measurement and strategic planning tools 
and, once the implementation has taken 
place, they benefit from the ability to:
• Set client-centred service standards 
and client satisfaction targets by 
gauging client expectations; 
 
• Identify service gaps by matching client 
satisfaction with the importance of 
each service element; and,
• Gain insight into client satisfaction 
with multi-channel experience as well 
as with services delivered through 
individual channels.
But it does not stop there. The ICCS 
provides CMT users with a range 
of additional resources and offers 
methodological guidance and support at 
each stage of CMT implementation, from 
survey design to analysis and reporting. 
The Institute also connects CMT users with 
their peers under the umbrella of the CMT 
Community of Practice, enabling sharing of 
insights, lessons learned and best practices.
Because the CMT was always meant to be a 
dynamic tool responding to the continually 
changing service environment, the ICCS 
conducts periodic reviews and revisions 
of the instrument. One such cycle has just 
been completed and, in early 2013, the 
Institute has made available to the service 
community the next generation of the 
instrument – the Enhanced CMT.
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Zeroing in on the needs of municipalities
The ICCS has by no means been the 
only organization bringing municipalities 
together and getting them to use common 
tools to identify best practices. Another 
such initiative is the Ontario Municipal 
CAO’s Benchmarking Initiative (OMBI). 
The origins of OMBI go back to the late 
1990s when amalgamation of Ontario 
municipalities by the Government of 
Ontario was taking place. This resulted in 
the need to align service levels between 
formerly separate local entities. Initially, the 
focus was on benchmarking performance 
on the basis of operational and financial 
data, however client satisfaction is now 
also being addressed as one of the key 
performance indicators.
Today, OMBI is increasingly developing a 
national scope as a collaborative platform 
for municipalities to collect data on a range 
of performance measures across various 
municipal service areas and to identify 
better practices leading to improved service 
delivery. In order to meet these objectives, 
the organization has developed the OMBI 
Performance Measurement Framework 
consisting of four types of measures: 
community impact measures, service 
level measures, efficiency measures, and 
customer service measures. Much of OMBI’s 
activity centers on expert panels which 
provide a forum not only for developing and 
refining the measures specific to various 
service areas, but also for learning from 
each other and exchanging information.
While OMBI has developed a robust way 
to collect and benchmark operational and 
financial data, it was felt that the measures 
related directly to the quality of service 
required further development. At the same 
time, the ICCS, building on the success of 
the CMT among local governments, was 
looking to develop a more specialized 
version of the tool, one that would focus 
specifically on the services provided in 
the municipal context. As a result, the two 
organizations formed a partnership and 
have agreed to combine their resources 
to work on developing a survey tool 
designed to address the client satisfaction 
measurement needs of municipal service 
managers.  
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The outcome of this collaboration, the 
Municipal CMT, is scheduled for launch in 
2013. The new tool will incorporate elements 
of the CMT and will also offer a new and 
unique way to gauge client satisfaction with 
municipal services across the full range of 
service areas. The project has identified 
a set of drivers of satisfaction specific to 
the municipal context and has introduced 
categorization into various service types, 
e.g., relational and transactional, regulatory 
and voluntary, direct and indirect. 
Of particular importance has been the goal 
of identifying drivers specific to uniquely 
municipal services that involve minimal or 
no interaction with municipal staff, such as 
garbage collection or road maintenance. 
The methodological approach behind the 
new instrument is designed to allow users 
to select survey questions that are most 
relevant to their service category and then 
to enable benchmarking of service areas 
belonging to the same service type across 
jurisdictions.
Conclusions
In many respects, municipalities are the 
level of government that is closest to 
citizens addressing their day-to-day needs. 
Because of this unique role, it is particularly 
important that they hear loud and clear what 
citizens receiving their services are thinking 
and feeling. The Municipal CMT offers 
municipalities a reliable way to listen to and 
act on the voice of their citizens. Leveraging 
this tool, municipalities can not only build 
effectiveness in meeting their clients’ needs 
and expectations, but at the same time 
can identify opportunities to achieve cost-
efficiencies in our challenging times. 
Nicholas Prychodko is Director of 
Research and International Relations
and Michal Dziong is Project Manager, 
CMT, at the  Institute for Citizen-
Centred Service, Canada.
To learn more about the ICCS and the CMT, 
please visit the Institute’s website at www.
iccs-isac.org or send us an email at info@
iccs-isac.org
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In the public sector, performance 
management is used by governments 
across a service system as well as by 
individual public agencies for their internal 
management. The positive benefits and 
potential adverse consequences of using 
performance management approaches 
across a system are similar to those that 
flow from using it within public agencies.  
For just as ‘gaming effects’ can be seen in 
how institutions respond to governments; 
so within organisations, managers will 
inevitably surrender to a tendency to 
manage ‘the numbers’ and not their service. 
However, the fact that performance 
management produces such gaming 
effects does not wholly undermine 
its utility.  Some form of performance 
management is highly useful to any 
central funder (whether it is a government 
itself or a funding agency) to improve 
the service outcomes of those public 
agencies that it funds.  To this end, all 
governments will devise an array of external 
incentives, reporting requirements and 
sanctions to encourage public agencies 
to focus their management attention and 
resources on specific service performance 
improvements. 
But performance management is also 
highly useful within large organisations.  
Public sector senior executives (including 
politicians and non-executives on public 
boards) will want to adopt performance 
management techniques so as to 
focus their organisational attention 
and resources on specific objectives.  
Performance management techniques 
Performance Management:  
a part of the answer 
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will offer them some degree of assurance 
that their organisation’s activities are 
aligned to achieving their desired goals.   
Organisations will fail to achieve their goals 
if they do not state them clearly and if they 
fail to focus and measure their activities 
in relation to these goals.  Thus in a very 
specific sense, performance management 
is the application of ‘discipline’ to the 
achievement of stated goals and objectives. 
For its proponents, through focussed 
‘deliverology’ it helps turn mediocre 
services into good services as Michael 
Barber acutely observed in ‘Instruction to 
Deliver’.
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One problem with performance 
management, however, is its 
widespread confusion with performance 
measurement.  Measurement is 
fundamental to management; but 
measurement is not the same as 
management. This distinction between 
measurement and management is 
encapsulated in the following three 
aphorisms:
• ‘you don’t fatten the pig by weighing 
it’
• ‘pulling up plants to check their roots 
doesn’t help them grow’
• ‘not everything that can be counted 
counts; and not everything that 
counts can be counted’  
These aphorisms contain simple 
truths but they do not negate the 
need for performance measurement.  
Measurement is central to the 
management of performance. You 
measure to analyse - to break things 
down into their constituent parts. But 
for management you need to make 
judgments about what should be 
changed; how it should be changed; 
when it should be changed; and who 
should be tasked with changing it? You 
cannot just rely on analytics if your goal is 
to generate organisational change.
 
That noted, measuring (or ‘benchmarking’) 
remains important.  There are three 
different approaches to measuring 
performance a ‘benchmark’. A normative 
approach focusses measurement against 
targets (however chosen). A comparative 
approach focusses measurement against 
others (a ‘universe’ or sample of others 
who are trying to achieve similar goals 
or who are performing similar activities).  
And finally, an ‘ipsative’ approach 
focusses measurement against previous 
performance (‘are we improving, staying the 
same or getting better?’).  Of course it is 
best, for any one public service, to measure 
performance against all three benchmarks.
The benefits of performance management 
in inherent weaknesses and unintended 
consequences of performance 
measurement approaches have been well 
documented.  Examples of unintended 
and adverse consequences can be found 
in the literature on police services, schools, 
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hospitals and Council performance. The 
downside of performance measurement 
techniques includes: ‘ratchet effects’; 
‘threshold effects’; and gaming effects 
generally.  More generally, many in- 
depth examinations of service failure (in 
say, children’s social care or safeguarding) 
point to an over-reliance on quantitative 
measures. 
Of course any managerial judgment 
based solely on quantitative measures is 
bound to fall short.  Rounded managerial 
judgments require quantitative measures 
and qualitative appraisals.  Moreover, 
managerial action is bounded by the 
emotional labour that is required in leading 
organisations as much as by the intellectual 
rigour of defining what has to be done and 
checking whether it is working effectively.
Since the abolition of the Audit 
Commission, the new emphasis in English 
local government on organisational “self 
improvement” requires a high degree of 
mature self awareness and honesty.  It is 
so easy for organisations to miss their own 
weaknesses, and in consequence delude 
themselves about their achievements 
relative to others.  An exceptional level of 
vigilant paranoia and creative discipline is 
needed for organisations to remain ever 
open to improvement.   Healthy high-
achieving organisations are open learning 
environments that are keen to innovate 
to improve their impact.  They don’t just 
aspire they focus on how they advance - 
how they move forward.   What applies in 
the world of business, applies equally in the 
public sector.  
Another issue is the problem that stems 
from asymmetry of information.  Senior 
public executives (whether elected 
or appointed) tend to respond to the 
information before them.  And in an era of 
ubiquitous data the issue becomes which 
information is the most relevant in deciding 
how the organisation should change to 
improve its effectiveness? 
The diagram overleaf shows simply two sets 
of sources of data and information.  These 
overlap.  First, there is the ‘internal world’ 
of the organisation - its costs, its activities, 
its ‘performance’.  Second, there is the 
‘external world’ in which the organisation 
operates.  
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The tendency that has to be avoided 
is one that reduces the world to the 
organisation; and that believes that the 
things that ‘we can control’ are the main 
things that matter.  Focussing on control 
factors is essential if we are to improve 
cost effectiveness and productivity.  But 
only focussing on control factors leads 
to a position where public organisations 
begin to worry more about how they 
compare to each other than what they 
contribute to society; amd where they 
worry more about the risks to them as 
public agencies than about the risks faced 
by the public they serve.
So performance management is a crucial 
part of the craft of public management.  It 
helps governments and public agencies 
focus on their efficacy.  But it remains just 
a part of the agenda for public service 
improvement and reform.
Barry Quirk is Chief Executive,  
LB Lewisham, UK
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 Diagram 1: beware  
 managerial reductionism
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the world ‘in here’  
that we think  
we can control
the world ‘out there’  
that we think  
we can not really control
‘risks to us’
or ‘the  
risks to them’
